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MOVEMENT LAWYERS: HENRY L. MARSH’S LONG
STRUGGLE FOR EDUCATIONAL JUSTICE
Danielle Wingfield-Smith *
INTRODUCTION
Born in 1933 in Richmond, Virginia, Henry Marsh was a protégé
of legendary Virginia civil rights attorney Oliver Hill, who was a
member of a civil rights legal team with Spotswood Robinson and
commissioned by Charles Hamilton Houston to investigate school
inequalities and prepare a legal strategy for dismantling segregationist laws.1 Growing up in Virginia during the 1930s, 40s, and
50s, Marsh was reared in the apartheid culture of Jim Crow society.2 Later, under Oliver Hill and Samuel W. Tucker’s mentorship,
Marsh studied Virginia’s legal and educational systems and
learned how to navigate Virginia’s seemingly tranquil Jim Crow
politics called “the Virginia Way.”3 Marsh is an ideal figure for
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law and Fellow, Gonzaga University School of Law,
Center for Civil and Human Rights; Ph.D., University of Virginia; J.D., University of Richmond School of Law. Thanks to Jonathan Stubbs, Jason Gillmer, Kim Pearson, Agnieszka
McPeak, and Derrick P. Alridge who read drafts of this Article and offered helpful comments, criticism, and encouragement. This Article also benefited from feedback from the
Rocky Mountain Junior Scholars Workshop at the University of Utah, the Northern Illinois
School of Law Faculty, the University of Virginia Center for Race and Public Education in
the South Works in Progress Series, the Gonzaga Law Faculty, the 2021 annual Law &
Society Conference, and the Southeastern Association of Law Schools (SEALS) 2021 annual
conference. Special thanks to Senator Marsh for the many hours he spent interviewing for
this project. Thanks for the excellent research assistance of Bailey Warrior Pahang.
1. HENRY L. MARSH, III, MEMOIRS OF HON. HENRY L. MARSH, III: CIVIL RIGHTS
CHAMPION, PUBLIC SERVANT, LAWYER 5, 19 (Jonathan Stubbs & Danielle Wingfield-Smith
eds., 2018); see also MARGARET EDDS, WE FACE THE DAWN: OLIVER HILL, SPOTTSWOOD
ROBINSON, AND THE LEGAL TEAM THAT DISMANTLED JIM CROW (2018) (arguing that no one
contributed more to the school desegregation efforts in Virginia than Oliver Hill and Spottswood Robinson).
2. See Gabriel J. Chin, Roger Hartley, Kevin Bates, Rona Nichols, Ira Schiflett &
Salmon Shomade, Still on the Books: Jim Crow and Segregation Laws Fifty Years After
Brown v. Board of Education, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 457, 457 (2006) (“Also, following Brown
in 1954, legislatures in some former Confederate states responded with a flood of legislation
designed to delay or prevent implementation of the integration of public schools.”).
3. See JILL OGLINE TITUS, BROWN’S BATTLEGROUND: STUDENTS, SEGREGATIONISTS,
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE IN PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY, VIRGINIA 11 (2011). “The Virginia Way” is a phrase coined by a noted historian and segregationist, Douglas Southall
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offering insight into how a movement lawyer and politician navigated the Virginia Way because his career intersected law, politics,
and Black leadership in Virginia from the 1950s into the early
years of the twenty-first century.
Marsh navigated systems of educational injustice and the laws
that influenced those systems in Virginia. Therefore, it is worth
noting that Virginia was a significant battleground in the fight for
educational equality in the United States.4 Several factors make
Virginia’s education and civil rights history essential to understanding movement lawyering during the national Civil Rights
Movement (“CRM”).5 Not only was it one of the battlegrounds for
Freeman, that breaks down the powerful meaning that lies behind the commonly used description of Virginia White politics. Id. Resistance ingrained into the fabric of Richmond’s
politics by those like Governor Stanley and Harry Byrd was the Virginia Way. Id. at 17–19.
The Virginia Way is marked by the persuasive tactics that White elites and leaders at the
helm of it who “allowed Blacks a semblance of autonomy so long as they remained within
the lines circumscribed by their white neighbors.” Id. at 11, 17–19.
4. See id. at 15; see also BRIAN DAUGHERITY, KEEP ON KEEPING ON: THE NAACP AND
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION IN VIRGINIA (Deborah E. McDowell ed., 2016); Robert A. Pratt, New Directions in Virginia’s Civil Rights History, 104 VA.
MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 149, 149, 154 (1996); Brian J. Daugherity & Charles C. Bolton,
Introduction, in WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: IMPLEMENTING BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION xiii (Brian J. Daugherity & Charles C. Bolton eds., 2008).
5. Virginia’s historic role in the CRM is essential because it is where the monumental
case Brown v. Board of Education began in April 1951 after a group of students led a strike
under Barbara John’s leadership, protesting all-Black Moton High School’s unacceptable
school conditions. See JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL
RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED HISTORY 27–28 (2001). One of the five cases heard
by the Supreme Court that together is comprised Brown v. Board of Education (1954) included plaintiffs from Prince Edward County in Virginia. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown
I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Davis v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952). Barbara
Johns and other students at the all-Black Moton High School sparked the school desegregation efforts in Virginia. Black Students on Strike! Farmville, Virginia, Separate is not Equal:
Brown v. Board of Education, SMITHSONIAN NAT’L MUSEUM OF AM. HIST., https://ameri
canhistory.si.edu/brown/history/4-five/farmville-virginia-1.html [https://perma.cc/3WX5-ZC
U8]. Moton High was in Prince Edward County. Id. The student protests led to Davis v.
County School Board of Prince Edward County, which legally challenged school desegregation. 103 F. Supp. 337. On May 23, 1951, attorneys Oliver Hill and Spottswood Robinson
sued Prince Edward County for the abolition of segregation on behalf of the parents of Prince
Edward students in the suit Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward. See Va. Case
Was One of 5 Originals, N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS, Sept. 8, 1962, at 27; Louis Lautier, Capital
Spotlight: Five Blunders in a Year Too Many, AFRO-AM., Aug. 30, 1958, at 4; Louis Lautier,
Are Virginia Pupils Going in Circles?, AFRO-AM., Sept. 28, 1957, at 20. There would eventually be three additional state cases grouped with the Davis case that would all comprise the
landmark Brown v. Board of Education case; in addition, there was a federal case arising
in the District of Columbia, Bolling v. Sharpe. See Brown I, 347 U.S. 483. On May 17, 1954,
the Supreme Court handed down a unanimous ruling that racial segregation in public education was unconstitutional. Id. Although the ruling was groundbreaking, the Supreme
Court failed to delineate any details for districts related to the requisite speed and manner
of desegregating their schools. Id. The Court’s ruling in Brown II on May 31, 1955, attempted to set these parameters. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). The
Court once again offered a vague qualifier, stating that desegregation was to occur “with all
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Brown v. Board of Education, but in its aftermath, civil rights
plaintiffs in Virginia filed more lawsuits than in any other state
with many cases leading to landmark decisions.6 Ten years before
Brown, a Virginian woman named Irene Morgan filed the first lawsuit to desegregate bus transportation systems.7 Irene Morgan was
a native of Gloucester, Virginia.8 Morgan was on her way to Baltimore, Maryland, on a Greyhound bus in 1944 when she was asked
to give up her seat to a White person.9 Morgan refused to do so
because she was feeling poorly having just had a miscarriage.10 She
was arrested after a confrontation with the sheriff and convicted
for resisting arrest.11 In Morgan v. Virginia, decided in 1946, the
Supreme Court of the United States struck down the Virginia law
that required segregation on commercial interstate buses.12 Also
ten years before Brown, the 1944 Supreme Court case Tunstall v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen originated out
of Virginia.13 It was a companion case to the Steele v. Louisville &
Nashville Railroad Co. case also decided in 1944.14 The Tunstall
case involved collective bargaining rights and colluded against
Black workers rendering them ineligible for membership of the union or “brotherhood.”15 The Court reaffirmed its opinion in Steele,
which held that the railway had a “duty to exercise fairly the power
conferred upon it in [sic] behalf of all those for whom it acts, without hostile discrimination against them.”16 These are just two examples of cases coming out of Virginia that laid the groundwork
deliberate speed.” Id.; see also James Hershman, The Origins of Massive Resistance, ENCYC.
VA., https://encyclopediavirginia.org/entries/massive-resistance [https://perma.cc/Y 8PBRV8Q]. The Court essentially permitted locales to move at their own pace, therefore freeing
Virginia’s segregationist leaders and school districts to engage in a movement to thwart the
mandate that Brown had enunciated, and that was equal educational opportunity. To
achieve that objective the segregationists engaged in activities commonly referred to as
“Massive Resistance.”
6. Jim Crow to Civil Rights in Virginia, VA. MUSEUM HIST. & CULTURE, https://vir
giniahistory.org/learn/jim-crow-civil-rights-virginia [https://perma.cc/S432-VBAW].
7. Lea Setegn, Irene Morgan, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, https://richmond.com/irenemorgan/article_d7873b66-e5ae-5f42-a399-38aa5548c8f0.html [https://perma.cc/NAA8-VS
QP] (Sept. 19, 2019).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Maryland Women’s Hall of Fame: Irene Morgan Kirkaldy, MD. COMM’N FOR
WOMEN (2010), https://msa.maryland.gov/msa/educ/exhibits/womenshall/html/kirkaldy.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/BTU8-XHZP].
11. Setegen, supra note 7.
12. 328 U.S. 373, 386 (1946).
13. 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
14. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
15. Tunstall, 323 U.S. at 211–12.
16. Steele, 323 U.S. at 203.
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for Brown. In the Tunstall case, Oliver Hill was on the brief with
Charles Hamilton Houston.17 Some of the best legal minds in the
Movement came to combat Virginia’s subtle yet impactful discriminatory system. This work created Virginia’s social milieu of the
time and subsequently created space for Marsh’s work amidst massive resistance just over a decade later.
Even with Virginia’s critical importance to the national CRM,
there remains a paucity of legal scholarship on humanist social
histories of Virginia civil rights lawyers’ everyday lives.18 The
scholarship on civil rights, education, and Massive Resistance in
Virginia has focused on state-level political developments and judicial rulings, and several well-known legal figures.19 As such, historians have studied Virginia’s legal approach to desegregation
and several key leaders, but few have examined the social history
of Black Virginia lawyers’ everyday lives and their strategies to
fight Massive Resistance.20
The lack of success of recent litigation efforts and the resegregation of many public schools have led to increased questioning of
Brown’s practical impact. As it relates to desegregation, the Brown
decision was the center of many legal scholars’ focus.21 Those in
favor of a court-centric approach to social change considered Brown
to be “the most important political, social, and legal event in America’s twentieth-century history.”22 However, in the years since
Brown, scholars, advocates, and members of the general public
alike often consider what real effect judicial rulings and review has

17. See ERIC ARNESEN, BROTHERHOODS OF COLOR: BLACK RAILROAD WORKERS AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 206 (2002).
18. See Kenneth Walter Mack, A Social History of Everyday Practice: Sadie T.M. Alexander and the Incorporation of Black Women into the American Legal Profession, 1925–1960,
87 CORNELL L. REV. 1405, 1405 (2002) (contending that “finely-detailed analysis of quotidian law practice reveals the methodological limitations of the reigning interpretations of the
history of the American bar . . . ”).
19. See generally Mark Golub, Remembering Massive Resistance to School Desegregation, 31 L. & HIST. REV. 491 (2013); Carl Tobias, Public School Desegregation in Virginia
During the Post-Brown Decade, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1261, 1266 (1996).
20. See generally MATTHEW D. LASSITER & ANDREW B. LEWIS, THE MODERATES’
DILEMMA: MASSIVE RESISTANCE TO SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN VIRGINIA (1998); see also
DAUGHERITY, supra note 4.
21. See TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG
HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 307–441 (2011) for a discussion of types of reform
efforts that emerged after decades of advocacy emanating from the CRM’s strategy to pursue
federal and state lawsuits to achieve desegregation and equitable funding.
22. J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND
SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954–1978 (1979).
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on social issues.23 Given this consideration, this Article explores
Marsh’s life’s work and ultimately posits that using a combination
of litigation, legislation, and on-the-ground activism is required to
ensure educational justice.
Scholars have explored several theoretical and practical approaches to this phenomenon.24 A more conventional analysis involves evaluating prominent education and related cases like
Plessy v. Ferguson,25 Gong Lum v. Rice,26 Brown v. Board of Education,27 Bolling v. Sharpe,28 and Milliken v. Bradley.29 Often, the
discussion of school desegregation cases encompasses scrutiny of

23. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Losing Faith: America Without Judicial Review?, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 1416, 1416 (2000) (“[I]t has become increasingly trendy to question whether the Supreme Court and constitutional judicial review really can make a difference.”); see also David Rhinesmith, District Court Opinions as Evidence of Influence: Green v. School Board
and the Supreme Court’s Role in Local School Desegregation, 96 VA. L. REV. 1137, 1138
(2010); Stephen C. Yeazell, Brown, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Silent Litigation
Revolution, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 1976 (2004) (“First, Brown and the civil rights litigation
movement helped create a renewed belief, not just in the law, but more specifically in litigation as a noble calling and as an avenue for social change. That belief lies open to challenge, and it can leave students and lawyers frustrated at the distance between the aspirations that brought them to law school and the world of practice as they perceive it. But
whether or not it is well-founded, this belief, with roots traceable to Brown and civil rights
litigation, has endured for several generations. Thus, Brown reshaped the aspirations of
lawyers in ways that are still important.”); Jack Greenberg, Evolving Strategies in Civil
Rights, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 117, 118 (1991) (arguing that from Plessy onward, “the courts
were not available as forums in which to achieve the right to equality; and Congress was
not available at all.”).
24. See Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Case for a Collaborative Enforcement Model
for a Federal Right to Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1653, 1659–60 (2007) (arguing that
“Congress should recognize a federal right to education through spending legislation that
the federal and state governments collaboratively enforce”); see also Tomiko Brown-Nagin,
“Broad Ownership” of the Public Schools: An Analysis of the “T-Formation” Process Model
for Achieving Educational Adequacy and Its Implications for Contemporary School Reform
Efforts, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 343 (1998). Scholars now posit that nonadjudicative approaches
rather than impact litigation are more likely to produce real systemic change when it comes
to public school reform efforts. See id. These nonadjudicative approaches can include both
legislation and litigation. See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Just Schools: A Holistic Approach to
the Education of Impoverished Students, 49 U. MEM. L. REV. 185, 198 (2018). Brown-Nagin
suggests “[a] [h]olistic [a]pproach to the [e]ducation of [c]hildren in [p]overty” includes using
legislation and litigation to effectuate school-culture based reforms like trauma informed
interventions. Id. at 194, 199, 201.
25. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
26. 275 U.S. 78 (1927) (upholding racial segregation in education with no dissenting
opinions based on the Plessy doctrine).
27. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), supplemented, Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (consolidating four school segregation cases: Brown v. Board of Education, Briggs v. Elliott, Davis v. County School Board, and Gebhart v. Belton).
28. 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (holding that the Constitution prohibits segregated public
schools in the District of Columbia).
29. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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judicial decision-making.30 Attention to this issue also frequently
embraces an evaluation of education equity advocacy groups’ goals
and legal strategy.31 For instance, scholarship has often explored
renowned National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (“NAACP”) and civil rights lawyers like Charles Hamilton
Houston and Thurgood Marshall.32 However, traditional legal histories rarely explore these public figures’ daily lives and personal
approaches to law and society.33
Missing from the historical record is an entire cadre of lesserknown movement lawyers who have had a significant and underappreciated impact upon educational equity in the United
States. Their insights, experiences, strategies, and accomplishments merit exploration, particularly because there are substantial limitations on a litigation-based approach, especially considering increasingly unreceptive courts staffed by judges who are
hostile to interpreting the law to promote equal educational opportunity.34 Because of this, a new broader approach to redressing education inequity is necessary.
In short, to unearth possible novel insights and strategies, historical archives and oral histories35 are useful supplements to legal
theories emerging through case analysis.36 The voices of lawyers,
politicians, organizers, and other leaders in these movements

30. See Wendy Parker, The Decline of Judicial Decisionmaking: School Desegregation
and District Court Judges, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1623, 1626 (2003).
31. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
808 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining the NAACP’s race-based transfer policy).
32. See J. Clay Smith, Jr., Thurgood Marshall: An Heir of Charles Hamilton Houston,
20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 503 (1993); Genna Rae McNeil, Charles Hamilton Houston: 1895–
1950, 32 HOW. L.J. 469 (1989); GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON
HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 72–74 (1983); Stephen Higginson, Thurgood
Marshall: Cases in Controversy, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 741 (2008).
33. See generally Mack, supra note 18.
34. Id.
35. I have access to over fifty interviews that I personally conducted with Henry Marsh.
In addition, I coedited his memoirs and have access to his papers and other oral history
interviews. This is a rare opportunity to be able to speak directly to and explore his life while
he is alive and able to tell his story.
36. See Cynthia Nicoletti, Writing the Social History of Legal Doctrine, 64 BUFF. L. REV.
121, 122–23 (2016) (providing a useful synthesis of various ways legal historians use appellate legal doctrine, ultimately arguing that legal historians seeking to understand how previous generations reconciled law and doctrine might be called the study of social history of
doctrine, which Nicoletti describes as an exploration of “the ways in which historical actors
(both lawyers and non-lawyers) understood the constraints and possibilities of doctrine”).
While I draw attention to Virginia’s desegregation litigation, I do so as a way to show
Marsh’s work and also provide evidence of the possible limitations of litigation as a tool in
and of itself.
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reveals a deeper understanding of the sociopolitical climate that
led to establishing laws, policies, and resulting resistance.
Henry Marsh worked on the CRM’s frontlines as a civil rights
attorney and later transitioned his efforts to politics and legislation. His work illuminates lessons that offer a framework to better
evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of the various approaches to achieving equal educational opportunity.37 Leaders
like Marsh, who organized and led the CRM, were on the ground
in communities registering voters and electing Black leaders to reinforce any progress in the courts.38
This Article’s primary purpose is to document more of the lawyers’ stories left out of the traditional scholarship on Brown and
CRM litigation in Virginia. Scholarship dealing with the NAACP’s
and civil rights lawyers’ school litigation campaign is not novel.
However, what is less explored is what this looked like in these
lawyers’ everyday practice, the implications of their methodology,
and why it matters today. Marsh’s professional and personal life is
a rich site for historical inquiry. This work offers a careful and nuanced analysis of Marsh’s professional and personal activities.
Marsh litigated cases to enforce federal laws and statutes mandating desegregation and thereby deter segregationists’ efforts to circumvent them. He realized the limitations of this litigation-based
approach. To expand the reach of his social justice efforts, Marsh
transitioned into a political system that had historically disenfranchised Black political leadership.
Part I considers Marsh’s early life and education, tracing how
his educational journey and rearing in the Jim Crow South framed
his future educational equity work. Part II discusses the history
leading up to and through Virginia’s Massive Resistance postBrown. The Part further explores Massive Resistance in Virginia
and details Henry Marsh’s involvement in fighting against it as a
civil rights attorney. Part III examines Marsh’s tools in his long
struggle for educational justice, which took the forms of litigation
and legislation. In telling Marsh’s story, the Article discusses more
than forty school cases that Marsh litigated himself or as part of
the legal team. These cases significantly impacted the speed of desegregation throughout the South and the rest of the nation. The
37. See generally Ronald E. Carrington, Henry L. Marsh III Elementary School, RICH.
FREE PRESS (Sept. 23, 2020, 6:00 PM), https://richmondfreepress.com/news/2020/sep/03/
henry-l-marsh-iii-elementary-school [https://perma.cc/JE9M-DJW3].
38. See MARSH, supra note 1, at 50–52.
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Part also offers Marsh’s strategic shift from lawyer to state legislator in his fight for civil rights justice. Part IV and the conclusion
offer the implications of Marsh’s story. The Part concludes with a
reflection of the takeaways of the story told in this Article and a
synthesis of Marsh’s overall strategy related to the broader Movement’s goals. In addition, the author suggests how these strategies
can frame the way advocates might address current education issues as well as other civil rights issues that remain at the core of
emerging social movements.
I. MARSH’S EARLY LIFE AND EDUCATION
A. Courting Educational Justice
“I went to a school that was set aside for African Americans, and
that school was five miles from my home, and there was no bus
transportation, so I walked to school every day, leaving at 6:00
o’clock in the morning and I got home around dark every evening
from first grade to . . . when I left the county.”
—Henry L. Marsh, III 39
While Marsh inherited an education litigation campaign from
his NAACP predecessors in the 1960s, his familiarity with inequitable education began as a child attending school in the small hamlet of Rescue in Isle of Wight County, Virginia.40 Marsh was a child
of the Jim Crow South.41 His life spans from the years the NAACP
initiated its desegregation campaign through today’s continued
struggle for educational rights for the disenfranchised.42 His educational journey through segregated schools, his career as a civil
rights attorney in the South, his public service as the first Black
mayor of the former capital of the Confederacy, and later his

39. See Voices of Freedom: Interview with Sen. Henry L. Marsh, III, VCU LIBRS. DIGIT.
COLLECTION (March 20, 2003), https://digital.library.vcu.edu/islandora/object/vcu:6153 [ht
tps://perma.cc/68UW-TUZQ].
40. The Honorable Henry L. Marsh, III Talks About his Role in the Desegregation of
Public Schools in Isle of Wight County, Virginia, https://www.thehistorymakers.org/biogra
phy/honorable-henry-l-marsh-iii [https://perma.cc/X9YB-Q8BU].
41. See id.
42. History: We Are the Country’s First and Foremost Civil and Human Rights Law
Firm, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, https://www.naacpldf.org/about-us/history
[https://perma.cc/6Q7G-K3X8].
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position as a state senator all allow one to peer into the daily lives
of the CRM’s front line.43
In 1935, two years after Marsh was born, NAACP leaders met to
determine the best strategy for overturning the Plessy doctrine and
initiating a desegregation campaign.44 From this meeting came
two strategic moves: first, narrowing the NAACP’s focus to the
Southern region; and second, attacking structural racism upheld
by the legal system.45
The very systematic racism that marginalized Black people was
reflected in the inequitable educational system that marked
Marsh’s early life in Southeastern Virginia. He attended elementary school in Rescue, Virginia, during the Great Depression and
World War II eras.46 Many of his experiences shaped his thought
about educational justice as a civil rights attorney and politician.47
Marsh describes his early segregated schooling as separate and unequal as far as being under-resourced and unfair, but not related
to receiving a lesser quality of instruction.48 These early school
43. See Robert C. Scott, Foreword, in MARSH, supra note 1, at x–xi.
44. The NAACP’s legal campaign against educational inequality began in 1930; however, 1935 marked the year that Charles Houston left his position as the Vice Dean of Howard Law School and joined the NAACP as special counsel and leader of the legal campaign.
The meeting, in part, was to determine how to spend a $10,000 grant known as the Garland
Fund, which was originally a $100,000 award given to the NAACP to study and determine
a strategy for the legal status of Black people. See MCNEIL, supra note 32, at 71–72; Larissa
M. Smith, A Civil Rights Vanguard: Black Attorneys and the NAACP in Virginia, in FROM
THE GRASSROOTS TO THE SUPREME COURT: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 130–31 (Peter F. Lau ed., 2004).
45. Patricia Sullivan, Prelude to Brown: Education and the Struggle for Racial Justice
during the NAACP’s Formative Decades, 1909–1934, in FROM THE GRASSROOTS TO THE
SUPREME COURT: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note
44, at 166–68.
46. See Ariana Westbrook, Henry L. Marsh III, (1933– ), BLACK PAST (Apr. 13, 2009),
https://www.blackpast.org/african-american-history/marsh-henry-l-iii-1933 [https://perma.
cc/BH4Z-5EJ9].
47. See id.
48. See MARSH, supra note 1, at 167–68 (discussing the inequities of separate schooling,
explaining “[i]t dawned on me that there was something unfair about the way the educational system was set up”); id. at 21 (discussing how Ms. Jordan, who taught Marsh in a
one-room, segregated schoolhouse with seventy-five students, did an “outstanding job” and
“attempted to ensure that we got a sound, basic education about American life and history”);
id. at 30–31 (“I found that African-American teachers seemed to intuitively know that their
black students would have to be better prepared to succeed in life. Frequently, we would
have to be twice as good to get half as far as our white counterparts. Accordingly, when they
pushed us to work harder to succeed I sincerely believed . . . [t]hey simply wanted us to
excel. One of the positive things that I learned about the segregated system was that we
had many black educators in leadership positions who really cared about us. They worked
hard to make sure we got the best education possible under the circumstances. While, of
course, I support school desegregation, I still wonder whether some of the white teachers
would have taken the same interest in me.”).
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years were Marsh’s first encounter with segregation, the very same
segregation that NAACP attorneys Houston, Marshall, and others
strategized how to defeat in the courts at the time.
Marsh ultimately determined that his segregated schooling was
unequal and unfair based on several experiences. From first to fifth
grade, he watched White children being bussed to school. In contrast, because there were no public-school buses to transport Black
students, Marsh woke up as early as 6:00 a.m., walked three to five
miles to school, and often did not return home until around dusk.49
Marsh felt it was unjust for him to walk by the school closest to
him because it was for White students only.
In fact, Marsh trekked to a one-room schoolhouse in all weather
conditions while his White counterparts had the comparative luxury of riding a bus. The educational inequality continued beyond
bussing, and Marsh remembers learning in a one-room school with
approximately seventy-five students of all grade levels.50 It was not
until later that Marsh discovered that the law required such discrimination.51
Students were not the only ones who suffered from segregated
conditions. Ms. Jordan, Marsh’s teacher, commuted by bus from
many miles away. Teachers like Marsh’s walked two or more miles
from the closest bus stop to get to work because the bus would not
take the teachers the entire way to the school.52 Marsh and other
students met Ms. Jordan at the bus stop to help her carry her bags
to the school. She would lodge nearby during the week and travel
by bus back home on the weekends.53 These same teachers were
also paid substantially less and worked in schools without books,
plumbing, or glass in their windows.54
49. Id. at 20–21.
50. Id. at 21.
51. Id. at 35 (reflecting on his early childhood experiences, Marsh states “there wasn’t
anything all that unique about my early childhood. My involvement with segregation
through high school and college was typical of African Americans. We didn’t like it. We resented it. We were disgusted by it. But we accepted it because it was the law”); see also VA.
CONST. art. II, § 19 (1902).
52. MARSH, supra note 1, at 21.
53. Id. at 21–22 (“Ms. Jordan commuted to Isle of Wight from Newport News. On Monday mornings some students would go to the bus stop at an intersection on Route 10 to meet
her. We carried her bags to the Moonfield Elementary School which was about a one mile
walk. During the school week, she would stay with someone who lived near the school. On
Fridays, we would walk her back to the bus stop where she would catch the bus to Newport
News. The following Monday, she would return to Isle of Wight.”).
54. See generally ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, A CLASS OF THEIR OWN: BLACK TEACHERS IN THE
SEGREGATED SOUTH (2007). Black students and teachers at Four Holes School in South
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In addition to the unequal and under-resourced schools, social
ills negatively affected children’s education. Poverty precluded
some Black students from attending school altogether because they
had to stay home to support their families.55 In the fifth grade
Marsh left Rescue, Virginia, and moved back to Richmond, Virginia, to reside with his father.56 He and his siblings attended Richmond’s segregated schools. Marsh enrolled in the all-Black George
Mason Elementary School, now named after Henry Marsh.57
Schools remained segregated, and some of the conditions mirrored
what he had experienced in Rescue, Virginia.58
While the segregation he experienced in Rescue, Virginia, somewhat carried over to some of his segregated schooling experiences
in Richmond, Virginia, it was less harsh. For instance, Marsh did
not have to walk very far to school in Richmond, Virginia. The
White children who lived in his neighborhood, closest to the Black
school, were bussed to an all-White school. Another distinction
from his schooling in Rescue was that each grade had its own classroom or designated place in the school.59
Marsh went directly from elementary school to Maggie Walker
High School, one of the two schools that Black children could attend, because there were no middle schools at the time.60 The differences in the academic opportunities between races were even
more apparent during Marsh’s middle and high school years.
Carolina lacked “adequate materials or books,” “functional plumbing,” “‘[w]indows in the
school [were] broken out, and the bathrooms [were] not fit to use.’” Luci Vaden, Before the
Corridor of Shame: The African American Fight for Equal Education After Jim Crow 64, 87,
173, 222 (2014) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of South Carolina) (on file with the University of South Carolina Scholar Commons).
55. See generally Richard Rothstein, For Public Schools, Segregation Then, Segregation Since: Education and the Unfinished March, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Aug. 27, 2013),
https://www.epi.org/publication/unfinished-march-public-school-segregation/ [https://perm
a.cc/Y7RT-R6U7].
56. See MARSH, supra note 1, at 27. Marsh’s mother passed away when he was a young
boy, leaving his father a widower of four children all below the age of seven, including a
small infant. Id. at 19. In these circumstances, including being in the Great Depression, his
father reluctantly felt compelled to send his children to live with relatives in Rescue and
Newport News, Virginia. Id.
57. The Richmond School Board voted in February 2020 to rename George Mason Elementary to Henry L. Marsh Elementary School. See Samuel Northrop, Richmond’s George
Mason Elementary Will Be Renamed for Henry Marsh, City’s First Black Mayor, RICH.
TIMES-DISPATCH (Feb. 19, 2020), https://richmond.com/news/local/government-politics/re
naming-richmonds-george-mason-elementary-for-henry-marsh-draws-support-at-public-he
aring/article_c58b77f7-df60-55fb-b153-affbc2bf27c5.html [https://perma.cc/M6NJ-XXQ8].
58. MARSH, supra note 1, at 27–29.
59. Id. at 167–68 (comparing schooling experiences in Isle of Wight County, Virginia
(Rescue) and Richmond, Virginia).
60. Id. at 31–32.
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Advanced subjects, like math, science, and foreign languages, were
limited in the Black schools.61 Teachers still taught students of
multiple age groups in one classroom.
While segregated schools’ conditions were less than ideal, Black
teachers were resourceful, capable, and community-oriented. They
took pride in their profession and cared for their students.62 During
this period, Marsh began to see school as more than a place of segregation and unfair practices. He began to see it as a place of opportunity. His teachers taught skills transferrable beyond the
classroom and into a society that still treated people differently because of their skin color. Marsh learned from teachers who expected their students to challenge systems and overcome these obstacles.63
Marsh attended the historically Black Virginia Union University and was there when the Court rendered its decision in Brown.
Marsh recalls in his memoirs the excitement students felt as they
learned of the Court’s unanimous decision.64 At that moment,
Marsh believed that it would take no more than a couple of years
for Richmond and the rest of the nation to implement policies that
would honor the Court’s ruling.65 Marsh, fully aware of the extent
of segregation in Richmond, still thought that employment and
public accommodations discrimination and segregation would
begin to dissolve along the same timeline as school desegregation.
Marsh believed that four or five years would be a realistic
timeframe to achieve full equality.66 The CRM became divisive in
a way that had not existed before Brown, and Union students felt
the difference.67 There were many interracial gatherings to discuss
race relations before the Brown decision. These types of discussions became irregular after the decision.68
When Brown was decided, Marsh was president of the Virginia
Union student body and more generally engaged in politics.69 Many
students were engaged in activism at the time.70 The local
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See id. at 167–68.
Id. at 30–31.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Voices of Freedom: Interview with Sen. Henry L. Marsh, III, supra note 39.
Id.
MARSH, supra note 1, at 1, 4.
See generally JON N. HALE, THE FREEDOM SCHOOLS: STUDENT ACTIVISTS IN THE
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newspaper released a notice that the General Assembly had scheduled a joint session to change a law to divert public funds to both
sectarian and nonsectarian private schools to thwart Brown’s mandate requiring desegregation to achieve equal educational opportunity.71 If the law passed, this would functionally be a means by
which public funds would support segregation.72 As the president
of the Virginia Union student body, he decided to attend the session and testify against the plan. He was the only student of approximately thirty-eight speakers.73 To his surprise, his picture
landed in the newspaper.74
While at the General Assembly session, Marsh met his future
mentor, Attorney Oliver Hill. There were about one hundred forty
people in attendance.75 He remembered that more than thirty persons were speaking out to urge legislators not to change the law.
Marsh remembered being “inspired by Mr. Hill’s presentation.”76
Hill spoke as a representative of the NAACP legal staff. Marsh
recalls how powerfully Hill made his case and expressed his anger
at the General Assembly for considering such a proposal.77 Hill was
at the height of his career and made a great impression on Marsh,
who was just a youngster in undergraduate school.78 After the
meeting was over, Hill went over to Marsh to tell him he had done
a good job on his speech. Marsh responded, saying that Oliver Hill,
too, had done a good job.79 Hill asked Marsh what he wanted to be
when he grew up, and Marsh told him that he would be a lawyer
just like Hill. Right there in that conversation, Hill offered Marsh
a job to work with him in his law firm after Marsh finished law
school.80 Marsh remembers this as one of the greatest moments of
his life. He had inadvertently auditioned for, and received an offer
for, a job as a civil rights lawyer before even going to law school. In

MISSISSIPPI CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2016); see also Kabria Baumgartner, “Be Your Own
Man”: Student Activism and the Birth of Black Studies at Amherst College, 1965–1972, 89
NEW ENG. Q. 286, 287 (2016).
71. MARSH, supra note 1, at 4.
72. Id. at 5.
73. Id. at 4 (“I was one of about 38 speakers and the only student who testified.”).
74. See MARSH, supra note 1, at 4.
75. Sharp Debate Held on Referendum, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Dec. 1, 1955.
76. MARSH, supra note 1, at 5.
77. Id. at 5–6.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 7.
80. Id.
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addition, Marsh was astonished that a Black man would stand up
to such powerful White men.81
Hill was at the ground level of “courting educational justice” and
challenging Jim Crow laws within the system. Hill’s mentor was
Charles Hamilton Houston, the chief strategist behind the
NAACP’s plan to use litigation to protect Black people’s civil
rights.82 Hill is also associated with Jesse Tinsley, the second president of the Virginia chapter of the NAACP.83
In 1940, years before the Brown decision, Hill, Thurgood Marshall, William Hastie, and Leon Ransom won a significant case towards securing educational equality. In Alston v. School Board of
Norfolk, Virginia,84 Hill and his colleagues secured a ruling in favor of equal pay for Black teachers.85 In his early practice, Hill litigated various educational rights issues. For instance, Hill fought
for the equalization of school facilities and bus transportation for
Black students.86 These efforts aligned with the NAACP’s original
goal of challenging school inequality in courts through cases involving teacher salaries.87 However, educational inequality cases
became more challenging to win with time. It was difficult to prove
that the plaintiffs’ experiences of inequity in these educational settings existed based on subjective proof of race discrimination.88 The
NAACP and other civil rights attorneys would continue to engage
courts, but the tactic would shift related to determining which
types of cases to litigate.

81. Id. at 5–6 (Marsh stating, “I had never heard any black person speak to white folks
like that”).
82. NAACP Civil Rights Leaders: Charles Hamilton Houston, https://www.naacp.org/
naacp-history-charles-hamilton-houston/ [https://perma.cc/3W5J-S3UA]; see OLIVER W.
HILL, SR., THE BIG BANG: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BEYOND: THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF OLIVER W. HILL, SR. 87 (2000) (“When I was in law school, we used to
call Dean Charlie Houston ‘Iron Pants.’ Charlie mentored both Thurgood Marshall and me
and was the one who took us to our first National Bar Association meeting.”); MCNEIL, supra
note 32, at 82.
83. A Civil Rights Champion, RICH. L. MAG. (July 9, 2018), https://lawmagazine.rich
mond.edu/features/article/-/15499/a-civil-rights-champion.html [https://perma.cc/QA7D-JZ
VY].
84. See generally 112 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, Einson-Freeman Co. v. Corwin, 311 U.S. 693 (1940).
85. See HILL, supra note 82, at 17.
86. See Larissa Smith Fergeson, Oliver W. Hill (1907–2007), ENCYC. VA., https://
www.encyclopediavirginia.org/Hill_Oliver_W_1907-2007#start_entry [https://perma.cc/BK
5A-6239].
87. See id.
88. See id.
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Going to the General Assembly as a Union student was Marsh’s
way of confronting segregation on behalf of himself and his fellow
students. Marsh and his student peers grew up with segregation,
and they did not like it.89 In fact, they resented it; they were disgusted by it.90 Marsh often notes in his interviews that he and his
contemporaries had accepted these discriminatory practices because it was the law.91 However, Marsh decided that since he believed in following the law, the only way for him to help achieve
any justice would be to challenge discriminatory laws and set a
new precedent. Marsh graduated from Virginia Union University
in 1956, cum laude.92 He then attended Howard Law School, where
he became a legal architect, protecting and fighting for civil
rights.93
B. Choosing the Movement
“Mr. Hill then asked, ‘What are you going to do when you grow
up?’ I said, ‘Well, I want to be a lawyer.’ He said ‘Well, why don’t
you come and work with me? I need some help.’ I was a college student. I said okay, and we shook hands on the agreement. Little did
I know that Mr. Hill would also be my future law partner.”
—Henry L. Marsh, III 94
It was time to end the 1896 Plessy precedent that embedded the
“separate but equal” legal principle into society’s fabric.95 The idea
that the inherently inferior Black facilities could ever be equal to

89. MARSH, supra note 1, at 35.
90. Id.
91. See generally id.
92. Howard University Alumni Association Celebrates Senator Henry L Marsh III with
“Trust and Service Award,” BELLE REP. (Mar. 5, 2018), https://thebellereport.com/
2018/03/howard-university-alumni-association-celebrates-senator-henry-l-marsh-iii-with-t
ruth-and-service-award/ [https://perma.cc/FZ3P-ACSJ].
93. Id. Marsh’s class produced “several of the early staff attorneys for the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the first African American governor in the United States, the first
woman prosecutor in Kentucky, and one of the first black members of the UCLA law faculty
. . . [and] [t]wo retired justices who served on the Supreme Courts of New Jersey and Florida.” Howard University School of Law, The Jurist: Our 140th Year, 19 NEWS J. 13, 13
(2009–2010). Even with this impressive group of attorneys coming into the field in the
1960s, there was a severe shortage of Black attorneys in law school during this time. Shortage of Lawyers, Va. Bar Group Told: Every Howard Law Grad Has Pick of Six Jobs, NEW J.
& GUIDE (1916– ), May 23, 1964.
94. MARSH, supra note 1, at 7; see also Interview by Julian Bond with Henry L. Marsh,
III, U.S. Senator, in Charlottesville, Va. (Sept. 13, 2000), https://blackleadership.virginia.
edu/interview/marsh-henry [https://perma.cc/LB7Q-TTKF].
95. See generally Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 303.
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White facilities was very distant from reality, especially concerning education.96 In the 1930s, guided by the legal strategies of Attorney Nathan Margold, the NAACP began to address the issue by
commissioning a study, the Margold Report.97 Attorney Charles
Hamilton Houston used the findings and suggestions outlined in
the Margold Report to form the NAACP’s “Equalization Strategy.”98 Houston surmised that the White schools would not financially support Black schools at the same level as they supported
White schools; thus, the strategy was aimed at forcing integration
through “equalization of conditions rather than immediate desegregation of public facilities.”99
The NAACP chose litigation as its primary tool for wielding educational justice. School cases had a profound and extensive history dating back to the NAACP’s early litigation victories like the
1938 decision in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,100 where the
Supreme Court refused to uphold the “separate but equal” doctrine, allowing a Black man admittance to the all-White University
of Missouri Law School.101 In 1950, Thurgood Marshall decided to
shift the NAACP and the Legal Defense Fund’s (“LDF”) focus from
supporting these equalization suits in Virginia and other states to
attacking de jure segregation.102 Margold would go on to mentor
Thurgood Marshall, who would take the reins from Houston as
Special Counsel for the NAACP.103 The strategic savvy of the
NAACP’s legal team of the 1930s and 1940s helped pave the way
for attorneys like Marsh who had to craft cunning strategies to dismantle segregation among other racist policies.

96. See id. at 385–86.
97. See University Publications of America, Inc., Margold Report 1930, in PAPERS OF
THE NAACP PART 3. THE CAMPAIGN FOR EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY: LEGAL DEPARTMENT AND
CENTRAL OFFICE RECORDS, 1913–1950: SERIES A: LEGAL DEPARTMENT AND CENTRAL
OFFICE RECORDS, 1913–1940 214 (1986), https://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/academic/
upa_cis/1510_PapersNAACPPart3SerA.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4ST-F5KP].
98. John A. Kirk, The NAACP Campaign for Teachers’ Salary Equalization: African
American Women Educators and the Early Civil Rights Struggle, 94 J. AFR. AM. HIST. 529,
529–31 (2009).
99. Id. at 531.
100. 305 U.S. 337, 337 (1938).
101. See MCNEIL, supra note 32, at 150–51, 199.
102. MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE
SUPREME COURT, 1936–1961 151–53, 155 (1994). De jure segregation is racial segregation
practices that are enforced by law.
103. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 136 (1975); LARRY S. GIBSON,
YOUNG THURGOOD: THE MAKING OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 177, 308, 334 (2012).
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Brown was another major “win” of litigation in the 1950s, which
overruled the landmark Plessy v. Ferguson case.104 This ongoing
civil rights campaign relied on litigation for social change, an idea
that many other campaigns would follow after witnessing the
Movement’s major victory with the Brown decision.105 As seen in
the example of Attorney Hill, however, there were various legal
means available to confront educational inequality. Choosing the
most efficient way was an essential part of the Movement’s approach.
Before Charles Hamilton Houston joined the NAACP’s leadership team, W.E.B. Du Bois warned the group that segregated education was not the best way to attack educational inequity.106 Du
Bois acknowledges that all things being equal, a broader desegregated education is better.107 He concludes, however, that things are
rarely equal and that if we are in a situation where the choice is
between hostile teachers that are going to lie to Black students and
supportive teachers who will tell children the truth, then it is best
to choose truth and support.108 Therefore, he contends that separate schools should be viewed in a more positive light and as a “new
. . . effort at human education.”109 Du Bois further contended that
real educational reform efforts should rest in Black people’s
104. See Mark Tushnet, Essay, Some Legacies of Brown v. Board of Education, 90 VA. L.
REV. 1693, 1720 (2004).
105. There are many studies focused on school litigation campaigns used to challenge
the status quo. See, e.g., id. at 1693–94; see also Smith, supra note 44, at 147 (highlighting
that the litigation strategy preceding Brown became a blueprint for civil rights cases across
the country); TUSHNET, supra note 102, at 12–15 (explaining how the NAACP chose schools
as its litigatory target); MCNEIL, supra note 32, at 134–36 (providing the specific strategy
and considerations underlying the school litigation campaign); KLUGER, supra note 103, at
255 (highlighting the results of the successful litigation campaign to end judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants). The CRM is not the only movement to use litigation
in this way; the Gender Equality Movement of the 1970s and 1980s leveraged litigation to
help its efforts. See, e.g., SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE
CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 58, 200 (2011); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY
EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 50–53 (1994). This is also evidenced through the Women’s Rights Movement, prison reform, abolition of capital punishment, protection of property rights, and the undermining of affirmative action.
106. KLUGER, supra note 103, at 165–66. In 1895, Du Bois was the first Black person to
receive a Ph.D. from Harvard University. W.E.B. Du Bois (1868–1963) AB 1890, PhD 1895,
HARV. UNIV. ARCHIVES: RSCH. GUIDES, https://guides.library.harvard.edu/hua/dubois [htt
ps://perma.cc/78U8-YN4X]. He was a founding member of the NAACP and known for being
one of the most prolific Black intellectuals of his time. Civil Rights Leaders: W.E.B. Du Bois,
NAACP, https://naacp.org/find-resources/history-explained/civil-rights-leaders/web-du-bois
[https://perma.cc/P9YT-3EHL].
107. W.E.B. Du Bois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 328, 335
(1935).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 334–35.
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insistence on controlling their separate schools in their administrative approach, hiring choices, and selecting textbooks.110 The
NAACP, however, was secure in its strategy and refused to waiver
on its “anti-segregation campaign.”111
Du Bois’s and other leaders’ debate about the strategy for attacking the inequality harkens back to Marsh’s explanation of the
excellent education he received from his teachers in segregated
schools.112 The educational system for Black people encouraged
children to believe they indeed could be as good as their White
counterparts.113 This belief was partly because of a social order
that focused on manners, pride in dress, athleticism, and cultural
enrichment through competition and music.114 In many schools, opportunities were not readily available, yet alumni of such schools
tend to speak fondly of those days, noting that they made the best
of what little they had.115 If they had one dress, they kept it clean.
They may not have had much food, but their mothers took time to
provide a filling lunch, even if it was just hoecakes and jelly. All
this was despite the fact that segregation in and of itself was an
oppressive system.
Marsh’s stories of his segregated schooling provide context for
the way the NAACP attacked school issues. Scholars have given
attention to the NAACP’s strategies.116 Less often, however, are
there personal accounts or narratives that bring the equalization
cases to life. This is one instance where Marsh’s personal
110.
111.

Id. at 335; see also Sullivan, supra note 45, at 166.
NAT’L HIST. LANDMARKS PROGRAM, U.S. NAT’L PARKS SERV., RACIAL
DESEGREGATION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: THEME STUDY 56 (Aug.
2000), https://www.nps.gov/subjects/tellingallamericansstories/upload/CivilRights_DesegP
ublicEd.pdf [https://perma.cc/BBG8-HDG3].
112. See generally Du Bois, supra note 107 (suggesting desegregation may not be the
solution to educational inequality in Black schools); Charles Hamilton Houston, Don’t Shout
Too Soon, 43 CRISIS 79 (1936) (arguing that a sustained fight against exclusion from Whiteonly institutions is the only way to achieve educational equality).
113. See generally Derrick P. Alridge, Teachers in the Movement: Pedagogy, Activism,
and Freedom, 60 HIST. EDUC. Q. 1 (2020) (highlighting the various methods employed by
Black teachers at this time of rapid social change); see also TCHRS. IN THE MOVEMENT,
https://teachersinthemovement.com [https://perma.cc/7UKG-NRLC] (“Teachers in the
Movement explores teachers’ ideas and pedagogy inside and outside the classroom during
the U.S. Civil Rights Movement. From teachers themselves, we learn how their pedagogy,
curricula, and community work were instrumental forms of activism that influenced the
movement.”).
114. See generally Alridge, supra note 113 (discussing the role of teachers as civil rights
activists while operating within this social order).
115. See id.
116. See generally MARK TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST
SEGREGATED EDUCATION: 1925–1950 (1987); see also Tushnet, supra note 104.
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experiences fuel his litigation strategy. For example, there was
nothing equal about attending a one-room school with a teacher
who commuted from miles away. Marsh went on to focus part of
his litigation strategy on the equalization of teacher salaries. Furthermore, it is striking that segregated schooling conditions, like
Marsh experienced in the 1940s and 1950s, are not far removed
from the current state of education in the United States nearly
eighty years later.117
The NAACP’s first course of action was strategically engaging
courts on school equity issues, like teachers’ salaries.118 Tackling
equity in teachers’ wages proved to be a challenging route.119 On
occasion, litigation was easy, and schools conceded to the notion
that they paid teachers different salaries based on race.120 However, the reasoning shifted, and schools argued that race was not
the determining factor for unequal wages and that qualifications
determined pay.121 Challenging the material differences between
school conditions by race also became difficult for civil rights attorneys, especially when rural White schools were just as run down
physically as Black schools, but had better books, microscopes,
labs, and other resources; or, if Black schools had newer facilities,
but still lacked resources.122
The NAACP quickly realized that they had to hone their efforts
and be more efficient in their tactics.123 They shifted to a litigation
117. See supra notes 53–63 and accompanying text.
118. See Voices of Freedom: Interview with Sen. Henry L. Marsh, III, supra note 39.
119. See id.
120. Mark V. Tushnet, Litigation Campaigns and the Search for Constitutional Rules, 6
J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 101, 102 (2004).
121. See id. Black teachers were limited in choices for continuing their education and
teacher preparatory programs. However, it is important to note that Black teachers were
often more qualified, carrying themselves as professionals and taking their jobs seriously.
See, e.g., Vanessa Siddle Walker, African American Teaching in the South: 1940–1960, 38
AM. EDUC. RSCH. J. 751, 773 (2001) (“African American teachers [in the South] worked in
dismal, unfair, discriminatory positions, but did not allow themselves to become victims of
their environments. Rather, they viewed themselves as trained professionals who embraced
a series of ideas about how to teach African American children that were consistent with
their professional discussions and their understanding of the African American community.”); see also TCHRS. IN THE MOVEMENT, supra note 113 (memorializing a national oral
history project that interviews teachers who taught in the 1950s–1970s and has an archive
of oral history interviews that challenges the notion that Black teachers were underqualified).
122. Tushnet, supra note 120, at 102.
123. It is important to note that ligation was not the only efforts taken towards effectuating the goals of the CRM. At the same time as desegregation cases, there was some other
important progress being made. First, work was being done to build up to the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The year of 1963 was a big year for the
movement with the March on Washington occurring in August of that year, which arguably
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approach, which required fewer resources and yielded more meaningful legal victories.124 However, litigation could not occur without
independent attorneys who took on cases given by the NAACP or
the LDF. Marsh was one of the attorneys that handled these
NAACP and LDF cases. Marsh’s story and many other of the Movement’s strategists are often left out of the legal record.

created a foundation for Congress to accept the Civil Rights Act of 1964. A tool that leaders
like Hill argued was important in the passage of this legislation and others that would protect the rights for all citizens was increased political participation for Black people.
124. See Tushnet, supra note 120, at 103–04.
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II. MARSH, MOVEMENT LAWYERING, AND MASSIVE
RESISTANCE: 1954–1969
A. Lawyering in the Movement125
“The fight for human rights is unending. We must never stop
fighting for freedom and equality for all.”
—Henry L. Marsh, III 126
Marsh’s journey in law, politics, and community leadership
spawned out of that single interaction with attorney Oliver Hill.127
Hill had helped begin the fight against laws that guaranteed the
segregation of educational and other facilities.128 Though the fight
had begun, it was a fight not yet won. Resistance to schools’ desegregation persisted long after the Brown ruling deeming state-sanctioned segregation of public schools unconstitutional. Thus, Hill
and other NAACP leaders passed the fight for equality to Tucker,
and Tucker to the young Marsh.129
Representation mattered and seeing Black lawyers, like Hill and
Tucker, motivated Marsh to engage in law to fight for civil and educational rights more broadly. Marsh never forgot the job offer he
received from Oliver Hill after meeting him at the General Assembly after his speech against unjust policies that undermined the
Brown decision.130 Marsh also never forgot Hill’s zealous advocacy
for civil rights.

125. Scott L. Cummings, Movement Lawyering, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1645, 1645 (defining
“movement lawyering” as “an alternate model of public interest advocacy focused on building the power of nonelite constituencies through integrated legal and political strategies”).
This Article subscribes to that definition.
126. MARSH, supra note 1, at 7, 180 (stating that Mr. Hill offered Marsh, a college student at the time, the opportunity to work with him. “Little did I know that Mr. Hill would
also be my future law partner”); id. at 16 (discussing factors that influenced Marsh’s decision to pursue a career of law and public service, stating, “It was Mr. Hill who brought us
together. It was Mr. Hill’s firm: Hill, Tucker, and Marsh”).
127. Id. at 7.
128. See generally HILL, supra note 82.
129. See DAUGHERITY, supra note 4, at 89 (“Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Tucker’s
principal cocounsel was Henry L. Marsh III. Marsh, a native of Isle of Wight County, alumnus of Virginia Union University, and graduate of Howard Law School, had joined Tucker
and Hill’s law firm in the spring of 1961. Before he took the job, Tucker warned Marsh:
‘Look, I’m a target. If you want to disassociate yourself from me, it will be okay.’ Marsh
refused, and spent much of the next two decades handling civil rights cases throughout the
state, even as he entered Virginia politics.”).
130. MARSH, supra note 1, at 7.
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Marsh’s experiences as a Black man who lived through segregation in the Jim Crow South fueled his passion. Marsh went to college when it was common practice to disallow Black people from
using restrooms or eating in restaurants while traveling.131 Marsh
remembers stopping at a gas station for gas and attempting to use
the restroom only to hear that he knew better than to use “that
room” because he was Black.132 Even though he was aware of the
time’s political and social climate, Marsh met every personal experience of discrimination with shock and disbelief. He was especially
aware of this when he traveled to parts of the deeper South where
racism was more blatant. It was a startling reminder of the challenges faced by Black people in general. It was these experiences
that strengthened his desire to practice as a civil rights lawyer.133
Marsh and Hill remained in contact during and after Marsh’s
time in law school. Before Marsh returned to Richmond, he worked
for the Labor Department in Washington D.C.134 During this time,
Hill was campaigning for Jack Kennedy. Once Kennedy was
elected, Hill would soon take an appointment in the Kennedy Administration.135 For this reason, Hill had to suspend his practice
for a while, so he pulled together Samuel W. Tucker from Emporia
and Marsh from Washington to form the Hill, Tucker, and Marsh
Law Firm.136 When Hill told Marsh the office was ready for him to
come, Marsh quit work in Washington immediately and returned
to Richmond.137 Hill’s goal in pulling in Tucker and Marsh was to
keep the Richmond, Virginia office going while he was away working in the public sector.138 After five years working in the Kennedy
Administration, Hill resigned from his governmental job to rejoin
the firm. 139 He continued to practice actively with Hill, Tucker, and

131. Interview by Julian Bond with Henry L. Marsh, supra note 94; see also MARSH,
supra note 1, at 35.
132. See MARSH, supra note 1, at 49.
133. Id. (“I had never traveled from north to south before: so to be forced to go into the
woods to use the bathroom was my own personal experience. Just coming face-to-face with
it. I think the experience of being forced to relieve myself in the woods was one of the things
that reinforced my desire to be a civil rights lawyer.”).
134. Id. at 14.
135. Id. at 15.
136. Id. at 14–15; see also Voices of Freedom: Interview with Sen. Henry L. Marsh, III,
supra note 39.
137. See MARSH, supra note 1, at 14.
138. Id. at 15.
139. See id. at 14–16.
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Marsh Law Firm from the time he returned in 1966 until retiring
in 1998 at the age of ninety-one.140
Hill chose Marsh and Tucker to keep things going in Richmond,
the epicenter of Massive Resistance, for a reason.141 Hill knew that
it was essential to raise young lawyers like Marsh to carry on Virginia’s desegregation efforts. Tucker was an ideal candidate for the
firm because Hill and other legal trailblazers recognized Tucker for
being a master strategist.142 Taking on segregation in Virginia
would require both Marsh’s strength as a newly minted lawyer and
Tucker’s seasoned savviness.
Tucker became Marsh’s mentor, law partner, and friend. You
cannot tell Marsh’s story without incorporating Tucker’s role in his
life and the Virginia CRM. Tucker is significant because he shaped
Marsh’s approach to law and desegregation. Tucker’s creative
strategies influenced how Marsh navigated Virginia’s legal and political terrain.143 Tucker and his family were huge proponents of
education as a means for endless life possibilities; therefore, it was
no surprise that Tucker zealously advocated for educational opportunity for the marginalized.144
Tucker and Marsh worked well together. Having practiced law
for many years, Tucker took Marsh under his wing as a son and
mentee. When Marsh arrived at the firm, the first order of business
was to come up with a way for Marsh to get paid.145 Marsh was new
140. Interview by Ronald E. Carrington with Oliver W. Hill, Sr., in Richmond, Va. (Nov.
13, 2002), https://digital.library.vcu.edu/islandora/object/vcu%3A37861 [https://perma.cc/5
RFF-FA23]; Interview by Julian Bond with Oliver Hill, in Charlottesville, Va. (Oct. 11,
2000), https://blackleadership.virginia.edu/interview/hill-oliver [https://perma.cc/2H6V-LM
RE].
141. See MARSH, supra note 1, at 15.
142. Until recently, when historian Nancy Silcox and a group of historians out of Alexandria, Virginia, published histories on Tucker, there were few documented sources about
his life and work. This lack of history on Tucker’s role in the movement is striking considering he organized the earliest known sit-in for civil rights in Alexandria, Virginia, when he
was refused a library card at the local library. See CHAR MCCARGO BAH, CHRISTA WATTERS,
AUDREY P. DAVIS, GWENDOLYN BROWN-HENDERSON & JAMES E. HENSON, SR., AFRICAN
AMERICANS OF ALEXANDRIA VIRGINIA: BEACONS OF LIGHT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
(2013); NANCY NOYES SILCOX, SAMUEL WILBERT TUCKER: THE STORY OF A CIVIL RIGHTS
TRAILBLAZER AND THE 1939 ALEXANDRIA LIBRARY SIT-IN (2013) for similar arguments of
Tucker as an unsung hero.
143. See MARSH, supra note 1, at 119, 121 (“Working with Tucker was quite an experience. He had an extraordinary analytical mind. He would cut to the quick of any issue. He
was particularly effective in appellant arguments. He got right to the issue, focused upon it
and stayed on it until he could get it resolved. . . . Being extraordinarily quick on his feet
helped to make him a superb litigator.”).
144. See generally SILCOX, supra note 142.
145. MARSH, supra note 1, at 15.
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to practicing law, and Hill would no longer bring in income to support the firm because he was leaving to work with the Kennedy
Administration in the District of Columbia. Tucker’s concern
moved Marsh because it demonstrated genuine care for him and
his family. The fact that one of Tucker’s top priorities was that he
be able to support his family, even though the two had only just
met, touched Marsh.146
From the beginning, Marsh’s goal was to use any money that he
earned to reinvest back into the firm. Marsh had hoped that this
would leverage his position, helping him establish himself as a
partner. Since the LDF was not paying them, Marsh proposed they
just split everything in half so that Tucker would not have to pay
him out of his pocket.147 They both agreed to these terms, and
Marsh was immediately promoted to partner for his generous contribution to the team. He went without pay for a while, putting
everything into the firm to show he was serious about contributing
as a partner.148
Research is sparse on Tucker’s role as a movement lawyer.
Tucker’s role in the CRM generally, and as a significant challenger
to segregationist laws in Virginia, is not typically the headline in
scholarly discourse. Therefore, it is no surprise that there are many
stories of lawyers and community leaders whose work has gone undocumented.149 This is another value of Marsh’s social history because he often discusses the impact that attorney Tucker had on
his life.150 As aforementioned, Tucker was there to guide Marsh in
his early stages in practice. Marsh states in an interview:
“[Tucker’s] life was consumed with protecting the rights of everyone and ensuring equal protection of the law. I had dreamed about
being a civil rights attorney and Tucker was the perfect answer for
me.”151
Marsh appreciated and learned from how Tucker could simplify
the most complicated cases, breaking down a complex set of facts
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 125 (discussing “unsung heroes” of the CRM). Some lawyers and political
leaders whose stories are lesser known include Rueben Lawson, civil rights leader in Roanoke and lawyer on one of Lynchburg’s main school desegregation cases; M.W. (Teedy)
Thornhill, who was a city councilman and first Black mayor of Lynchburg; Hermanze
Faunteleroy, city councilman the first Black mayor of Petersburg; and Noel C. Taylor, the
first Black mayor of Roanoke, Virginia.
150. Id. at 119; see also Interview by Julian Bond with Henry L. Marsh, supra note 94.
151. MARSH, supra note 1, at 119.
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to find the legal issue quickly.152 Not only that, but he was not easily intimidated and would not back down in a legal argument until
the other attorney was utterly demoralized.153 An example of
Tucker’s prowess was a letter he sent to the Alexandria Librarian
after she denied him a library card. Instead of approving him for a
library card at his preferred library, she offered him a library card
to a library that did not yet exist.154 Tucker’s response to Miss Scoggin stated:
I refuse and will always refuse to accept a card to be used at the library
to be constructed and operated at Alfred and Wythe Streets in lieu of
[a] card to be used at the existing library on Queen Street for which I
have made application. Continued delay—beyon[d] the close of this
month—in issuing to me a card for use at the library on Queen Street
will be taken as a refusal to do so, whereupon I will feel justified in
seeking the aid of court to enforce my right.155

Marsh remembered Tucker for being energetic, a hard worker,
and a close friend who was more like a father.156 However, Marsh’s
mentor was a target, as Tucker was almost disbarred twice because
of laws set in place to try to discourage lawyers from taking
NAACP cases.157
The shortage of Black lawyers158 was a factor that greatly exacerbated the challenges that civil rights attorneys like Marsh faced.
Their work as attorneys required collaboration and mutual respect
of the opposing attorneys and judges. These lawyers argued for justice for Black people in segregated courtrooms. Black attorneys advocated for their clients’ rights after the lawyers had to sit on segregated busses themselves. W.E.B. Du Bois suggests that “while
the work of a physician is largely private, depending on individual
skill, a lawyer must have co-operation from fellow lawyers and

152. Id. at 121.
153. See id.
154. See 1939 Alexandria Library Sit-In, ALEXANDRIA LIBR., https://alexlibraryva.org/
1939-sit-in [https://perma.cc/SQZ7-C2JT] (Oct. 2021).
155. Samuel Wilbert Tucker, Letter from Samuel W. Tucker to Alexandria Library, February 13, 1940, ALEXANDRIA LIBR.—SPECIAL COLLECTIONS (Feb. 2004), https://alxndria.
ent.sirsi.net/custom/web/lhsc/sitin/tuckerletter/letter.html [https://perma.cc/QG37-JSRD].
156. MARSH, supra note 1, at 121–22 (“He was extremely energetic. Sometimes we would
stay up all night working on cases and go to work the next day.”). When Tucker would stay
up working through the night and could not drive back to his home in Emporia, he would
often stay with Marsh and his family. Id.
157. Id. at 37.
158. Shortage of Lawyers, Va. Bar Group Told: Every Howard Law Grad Has Pick of Six
Jobs, supra note 93.
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respect and influence in court; thus prejudice or discrimination of
any kind is especially felt in this profession.”159
Sadly, many of the Du Boisian era conditions were still prevalent
for lawyers in Marsh’s day. Whereas other Black lawyers in the
country may have struggled to make a name for themselves in the
legal profession, Marsh could benefit from the mentorship and tutelage of lawyers already steeped in the Movement. Hill served as
the chairman of the legal staff of Virginia’s NAACP branch and
Tucker later served in that same capacity; Tucker also worked on
the landmark Martinsville Seven and Swansboro cases.160 Tucker
would establish a firm in Emporia and also consult on cases with
Hill.161 By the time Marsh and Tucker began their collaboration,
Tucker had been practicing for nearly twenty years.162
Marsh recalled that one of the most challenging aspects of practicing the law during this period was keeping pace with the very
demanding caseload.163 Many of his cases required him to oppose
parties represented by some of the largest law firms in the Commonwealth.164 Because Marsh was fighting from a smaller firm
with limited resources for clients with many odds against them, he
handled these cases with great attention to detail.165
Civil rights attorneys were not getting paid much outside of the
fifty dollars per diem offered by the NAACP.166 Often, they did not
even receive the promised per diem to take these cases.167 In contrast, the opposing side paid their lawyers two hundred or more
dollars to represent segregationist leaders who headed Massive
Resistance against Brown.168
Marsh, along with his law partner Tucker, worked every day of
the week, sometimes taking Sunday off. This work-life imbalance
was common practice for many civil rights attorneys across the
country.169 For Marsh’s firm, a strong work ethic with very few
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE PHILADELPHIA NEGRO: A SOCIAL STUDY 114–15 (1996).
MARSH, supra note 1, at 13–14, 44.
See id. at 14. See generally SILCOX, supra note 142.
MARSH, supra note 1, at 15.
Id. at 58.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id.
See generally KENNETH MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS LEADER (2012). Marsh’s work ethic was in part due to his commitment to
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breaks was required to keep up with the demands of litigation. The
breaks they did receive on occasion came in the form of time off to
attend conferences a couple of times of the year, which still involved work.170 They took cases in other areas of practice outside
of civil rights on occasion, but civil rights cases were prioritized.171
No one was getting rich; but, the doors were able to stay open and
the firm afloat. Marsh was proud that no matter what, they never
failed to make payroll for their employees.172 Finding ways to financially stay afloat during this era was a key component of movement lawyering.
B. Massive Resistance: The Virginia Way
By the time Marsh arrived at the law firm Hill, Tucker, and
Marsh in 1961 to begin a career in law, Virginia’s Massive Resistance effort had become the national model for southern states
to resist integration.173 The segregationist sociopolitical environment that was so pervasive in the early 1960s was the direct result
of a history of legally sanctioned race discrimination. Schools, juries, and buses were all still segregated. Marsh would go on to have
a hand at fighting to integrate them all.174
Massive Resistance utilized the Court’s parameters set in Brown
II to move “with all deliberate speed” in opposition to integration.175 The Court failed to specify timeframes or define an acceptable manner by which desegregation would happen, leaving the door
open for districts to obstruct the Court’s mandates.176 This same

representation in the Black community; however, at many junctures of Marsh’s life (especially in his transition to politics) we see that he was expected of the community to be authentically Black and at the same time acquiesce to the standards of a White profession.
Marsh’s story is another example of Mack’s thesis in Representing the Race. See id. One
reason why Marsh’s story is used to illustrate the point of this Article and not merely a
review of the many cases that he worked, is that law and identity go hand in hand. See
Kenneth W. Mack, Response, Civil Rights History: The Old and the New, 126 HARV. L. REV.
F. 258, 260 (2013); see also Kim Forde-Mazrui, Learning Law Through the Lens of Race, 21
J.L. & POL’Y 1, 4 (2005) (arguing that “law can be more adequately understood and evaluated when examined through the lens of race, that is, when considered in view of the role
race has had in the development, administration, or consequences of the law”).
170. MARSH, supra note 1, at 58.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See id. at 16.
174. See generally id.
175. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (deciding the issue
of relief).
176. Id. at 300.
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obstructionism would spill over into other parts of the CRM, and
subsequently, it would take decades of fighting for the deliberate
speed of justice for Black Americans.
The Commonwealth of Virginia systematically created laws and
policies to delay the inevitable: no more Black schools, and no more
White schools, but just “schools.”177 Even still, Massive Resistance,
headed by the Byrd machine and maintained by much of the day’s
White leadership, proved to be a formidable opponent.178 If Black
children somehow managed to find a way into these all-White
schools, Massive Resistance found a way to cut the schools’ funding. In four cases the schools shut down completely.179
The day after the ruling, the Richmond Times-Dispatch headlined the decision and Virginia’s political leaders’ responses.180 At
this moment, Marsh, a student at the historically Black Virginia
Union University, first grasped the idea that his timeline for desegregation was inaccurate.181 He knew then that Virginia would
put up a fight by engaging in what is now known as Massive Resistance.182 The newspaper quoted Senator Harry F. Byrd saying
that “the court’s decision ‘will bring implications and dangers of
the greatest consequence.’”183 To Marsh, the talk of Massive Resistance and the rise of segregationist leaders all represented the
making of a brutal fight ahead; this caused many to pause and
think that the world they had hoped for would never be realized.184
Marsh explained Massive Resistance as the segregationists’
“various and nefarious attempts” to reverse any of Brown’s practical outcomes.185 Marsh went to law school partly because he
wanted to win against Massive Resistance, and this was precisely
the first order of business at the newly established Hill, Tucker,
and Marsh firm.186

177. Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968).
178. See MARSH, supra note 1, at 65–66.
179. See LASSITER & LEWIS, supra note 20, at 7–8, 16, 84–96, 104, 135 (stating schools
were shut down in Charlottesville, Prince Edward, Norfolk, and Front Royal in Warren
County).
180. School Segregation Is Unconstitutional, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, May 18, 1954, at 1.
181. See MARSH, supra note 1, at 3.
182. Id.
183. School Segregation Is Unconstitutional, supra note 180, at 1.
184. MARSH, supra note 1, at 3.
185. Id. at 41.
186. See id. at 5–7, 14–16.
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During the height of Massive Resistance, the NAACP local
branches functioned as a hub for churning out most of the civil
rights agenda.187 Marsh remembers nearly forty of the almost seventy chapters around the Commonwealth being very active.188
These active branches initiated lawsuits to implement desegregation and public accommodations across the state.189 The NAACP
used litigation to agitate things.190 Marsh took on many of these
cases in his role fighting Massive Resistance.191
Marsh remembers a NAACP pioneer, W. Lester Banks, the
NAACP’s Executive Secretary, as the person who exemplified everything that the NAACP stood for during this period.192 Banks led
the NAACP’s Virginia State Conference in Richmond, which was
also the NAACP’s state headquarters for Virginia.193
Some historians posit that the NAACP was a very important
civil rights organization in Virginia during the Movement.194 As
such, the NAACP would use state conferences and annual meetings to create the synergy necessary to influence change.195
Marsh’s aunt would make sure he attended the youth chapter
events at state conferences; she would even go as far as paying to
rent a bus to fill with children to send to these NAACP meetings.196
These conferences “stirred things up” and “kept the grassroots
movement going.”197
The CRM and its lawyers’ efforts to desegregate schools caused
an insurrection, or Massive Resistance, from segregationists in opposition. Virginia spearheaded the strategy of Massive Resistance
and therefore is a state worthy of examination.198 To comprehend
187. Id. at 41; see also TUSHNET, supra note 102, at 247–56.
188. MARSH, supra note 1, at 41; see also HILL, supra note 82, at 179 (“[T]he Virginia
State NAACP during the 1940s and 1950s was the strongest and most active conference in
the country and had the most extensive program challenging unlawful racial discrimination.”).
189. TUSHNET, supra note 102, at 247–48. Tushnet describes this period during which
the NAACP utilized litigation to secure desegregation as a “legislative movement toward
massive resistance.” Id. at 248.
190. Id.
191. See generally MARSH, supra note 1; see also Interview by Julian Bond with Henry
Marsh, supra note 94.
192. MARSH, supra note 1, at 41.
193. Id. at 41–42.
194. See generally DAUGHERITY, supra note 4.
195. MARSH, supra note 1, at 41.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Tobias, supra note 19, at 1266; see also BENJAMIN MUSE, VIRGINIA’S MASSIVE
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how Virginia effectively avoided integrating public schools for almost a decade after the Brown decision is a multifaceted task that
requires great perception.
Scholars still debate the extent to which Brown was successful
because many school districts could avoid integration for at least a
decade after the Court ordered schools to desegregate.199 The Supreme Court’s language of “all deliberate speed” in its ruling left
integration a choice that was up to the southern circuit and district
court judges to decide.200 Another significant consideration that explains Virginia’s evading of the law for years post-Brown is its
unique political environment and southern mentality, known as
“the Virginia Way.”201
Historically, Virginia is part of this conversation because of several Supreme Court decisions that garnered national attention.
Chief among them was Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I).202
However, many Virginia cases accompany litigation strategies that
should be more broadly studied as they set a national precedent for
schools’ desegregation. Virginia was legally at the forefront of race
debates throughout the CRM, with the NAACP filing more lawsuits in Virginia than any other state.203
As long as laws and policies institutionalized racism and discrimination against Black people, minimal tangible progress could
be made. Richmond, the Confederacy’s old capital, was almost as
rigid and segregated as it could get in Virginia.204 There was a

RESISTANCE 21 (1961) (describing pledges made); CHARLES P. ROLAND, THE IMPROBABLE
ERA: THE SOUTH SINCE WORLD WAR II 35 (1976) (detailing reactions to Brown).
199. See Jim Hilbert, Restoring the Promise of Brown: Using State Constitutional Law to
Challenge School Segregation, 46 J.L. & EDUC. 1 (2017) (arguing that Brown’s promise has
yet to be realized and state and federal courts failed to adequately address inequalities and
segregation in America’s public schools).
200. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (deciding the issue
of relief); see also Tobias supra note 19, at 1301 (“If the Court failed to exhibit the clear,
strong resolve, to exercise moral leadership and to afford the instructive guidance that
might have led to Brown’s rigorous effectuation, it is unclear why lower federal court judges
would have insisted upon integration’s vigorous implementation. After all, those circuit and
district judges came out of, and lived and worked in, the same society that had perpetuated
segregation for centuries.”).
201. See supra note 3; see also Danielle Wingfield-Smith, Pardon Me Please: Cyntoia
Brown and the Justice System’s Contempt for the Rights of Black People, 35 HARV.
BLACKLETTER L.J. 85, 87 (2019) (defining the “Virginia Way” as “a white supremist regime
cloaked in congeniality” that took the lead in Massive Resistance efforts).
202. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
203. See Jim Crow to Civil Rights in Virginia, supra note 6.
204. See generally Robert R. Merhige, Jr., A Judge Remembers Richmond in the PostBrown Years, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 23 (1992).
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difference between how change progressed in the Confederacy’s
capital versus how changes were taking place with civil rights
work in the South generally. The Commonwealth of Virginia was
a forerunner in the CRM in both driving the litigation strategy and
in Massive Resistance. Therefore, Virginia set the tone for other
states in both areas.205
One of Oliver Hill’s most famous quotes came at a rally in
Farmville, Virginia, in Prince Edward County following the Brown
decision’s backlash where he said, “the whole world is watching
Prince Edward.”206 In law and politics, both White and Black leaders knew if they could defeat segregation in Prince Edward County,
Virginia, it would be difficult for other states to maintain these
types of segregationist laws in the future.207 Moreover, Virginia’s
history is relevant because, arguably, Massive Resistance began in
Virginia and spread throughout the South.208
In November 1955, not even six months after the Brown II ruling, Virginia state senator Garland Gray rolled out the “Gray
Plan,” which proposed to repeal the compulsory school attendance
law to allow White students the ability to evade desegregation.209
This was after appointing a board called the Gray Commission to
analyze Brown and determine a proper response.210 In February
1956, U.S. Senator Harry F. Byrd, Sr. created the “Massive Resistance” strategy, which empowered Richmond to resist Brown.211
NAACP attorney Oliver Hill called this and the General Assembly’s legislation that allowed the governor to close schools wherever
courts ordered them desegregated “pervasive silliness.”212 Hill also
attributed this “statewide mania” in part to “the backward leadership of people like Senator Harry Byrd, Sr., and the infamous Byrd
political machine.”213

205. See Jim Crow to Civil Rights in Virginia, supra note 6.
206. County Negroes, FARMVILLE HERALD, June 19, 1959. See generally BOB SMITH,
THEY CLOSED THEIR SCHOOLS: PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1951–1964 (1965).
207. See RAYMOND WOLTERS, RACE AND EDUCATION 1954–2007 103 (2008).
208. See Tobias, supra note 19, at 1265–66; see also ROBBINS L. GATES, THE MAKING OF
MASSIVE RESISTANCE: VIRGINIA’S POLITICS OF PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, 1954–1956
xvii (1964); NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN
THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950S 341 (1969).
209. See GATES, supra note 208, at 63.
210. See id. at 31.
211. See generally J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, HARRY BYRD AND THE CHANGING FACE OF
VIRGINIA POLITICS 1945–1966 (1968).
212. See HILL, supra note 82, at 160.
213. See id. at 160–61.
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On March 13, 1956, Harry F. Byrd and ninety-eight other members of the 84th United States Congress authored the “Southern
Manifesto,” also known as the Declaration of Constitutional Principles.214 The document laid out its opposition to court-mandated
desegregation brought about by the Brown decision and the resulting goal of the CRM to overthrow the southern caste system known
as Jim Crow.215 The Southern Manifesto became the catalyst for
“the [single] worst episode of racial demagoguery in modern American political history.”216 Harry Byrd, Sr. of Virginia, and J. Strom
of South Carolina would be its principal authors.217
In his autobiography, Oliver Hill offered his reaction to Brown,
remembering how when Byrd came back in town to hear about the
Court’s decision, Byrd “rallied segregationists to fight against the
law of the land.”218 Segregationists’ efforts continued past Byrd by
those who vowed to maintain the Massive Resistance initiative.
One example is Governor Thomas B. Stanley’s Massive Resistance
legislation and the Stanley Plan, which was signed into law in 1956
by Virginia Governor J. Lindsey Almond.219
Almond220 would later close Warren County High School, Lane
High School and Venable Elementary in Charlottesville, and White
Norfolk elementary schools to prevent desegregation.221 In 1956
several victories in federal courts ordered the reopening of schools
in Arlington and Charlottesville.222
Scholars well document the methods and strategies of the Massive Resistance movement. However, few comprehensive studies
give voice to the unique role that the Commonwealth of Virginia
214. JOHN KYLE DAY, THE SOUTHERN MANIFESTO: MASSIVE RESISTANCE AND THE FIGHT
TO PRESERVE SEGREGATION 3 (2014).
215. See generally id.
216. Id. at 126.
217. BARTLEY, supra note 208, at 117 (stating that Byrd “originated the term ‘massive
resistance’ and played a crucial role in its evolution in his home state and in the attempt to
create a South-wide effort. No man did as much to move the front lines of opposition from
the Deep South to Washington, D.C., and the Potomac River”).
218. See HILL, supra note 82, at 173.
219. See DAUGHERITY, supra note 4, at 53.
220. Most of the school battle during Almond’s and his successor’s administration took
place in the federal courts. One of the primary issues regarding the federal courts’ primary
position in the school battle was whether or not a state or federal court had the power to
force a county to institute taxes to support public schools and also the state’s constitutional
responsibility. See SMITH, supra note 206, at 152.
221. See LASSITER & LEWIS, supra note 20, at 84–96 (discussing the school closings at
Warren County High School, Lane High School, Venable Elementary and other schools that
closed).
222. Id.
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and its key movement leaders played in the fight to dismantle this
movement’s very heart that sought to derail the progress of justice
for Black people in the United States.
Some historians argue that there is much to learn from Virginia,
a southern state situated further north, which still aggressively
opposed equal education in the post-Brown era.223 The Washington
Post quoted Benjamin Muse in placing Virginia’s unique position
as being the forerunner in this struggle in context by saying: “Virginia, with its glorious role in the early history of the republic and
again in the struggle for the great Lost Cause—also with its genteel and honored political leadership of the day—was surely indicated to carry the banner of the South in this latest conflict.”224
In September of 1959, schools were still closing in Virginia. This
time, it was Prince Edward County Schools where it all began.
Prince Edward was closing even though Massive Resistance had
lost steam.225 When Hill’s protégés, Samuel W. Tucker and Henry
Marsh, emerged on the scene in the 1960s, a host of school cases
would require litigation before meaningful school desegregation
could occur in Virginia.226
By 1959 and into 1960, new legislation included mechanisms
like the pupil placement board and tuition grant laws, which effectively favored White parents who desired to maintain segregated
schools.227 The new legislation purposefully created a way to tie up
the desegregation process in the federal courts. After this new legislation passed, litigation became more of an uphill battle for
NAACP and civil rights attorneys because the state and localities
223. See generally DAY, supra note 214; see also Brian J. Daugherity, “Keeping on Keeping On”: African Americans and the Implementation of Brown v. Board of Education in Virginia, in WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: IMPLEMENTING BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION, supra note 4. Richmond historian, Brian Daugherity, makes a case for this, pointing out Sarah
Boyle’s statement that Virginia “was the backbone of the South, which was the backbone of
the nation, which was the backbone of the world,” and Senator Harry Byrd’s statement, “If
Virginia surrenders, if Virginia’s line is broken, the rest of the South will go down, too.” Id.
at 267 n.20.
224. Id. (citing BENJAMIN MUSE, VIRGINIA’S MASSIVE RESISTANCE 159 (1961)).
225. Massive Resistance was losing steam because when resistance originally ensued in
1959, segregationist’s strategy was to get a win in Prince Edward County as it related to
the privatization of schools. They believed that this would create a ripple effect throughout
the “black belt.” The black belt was comprised of thirty or more Virginia counties with a
dense Black population. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 206, at 161 (stating the Prince Edward
case persuaded other rural counties to establish private schools without abandoning public
schools); see also Court Refuses U.S. Entry into Prince Edward Suit, S. SCH. NEWS, July,
1961, at 1.
226. See generally MARSH, supra note 1.
227. Id. at 44–45.
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interested in preserving segregated schools had the requisite resources, including staff and finances, to defend school boards. Segregationists, however, weren’t prepared for civil rights attorneys
like Marsh to have “staying power” and play the long game until
schools were held fully accountable for serving the educational
needs of Brown and Black students.228
At this point, litigation as the most efficient strategy for school
desegregation began to wane. Virginia’s ability to continuously
prevent its schools from integration exemplified the idea that the
courts were unable to desegregate Virginia’s schools in and of itself.229 Judges in Virginia’s courts would rule that Black people
should be allowed to attend all-White schools; however, they also
held that school systems were only required to prohibit discrimination and not ordered to integrate its schools.230
III. LITIGATION AND LEGISLATION: MARSH’S TOOLS FOR
EDUCATIONAL JUSTICE
The era following World War II seemed to be a season of hopefulness. The fact that many Black communities in southern cities
during the early 1950s were mobilized with the help of Negro Voters’ Leagues aroused hope.231 Further, civil rights litigation during
this era garnered some significant wins. By 1950, the NAACP had
won well over ninety percent of its cases in the Supreme Court.232
Dating back to 1938, the Supreme Court overturned several prosegregation precedents, including changing rulings on restrictive
covenants and White primaries’ rules.233 Over time they also desegregated law schools,234 required states to offer Black people access to in-state graduate and professional programs,235 and

228. Id. at 58.
229. Id. at 44–45.
230. Id.
231. DAVID R. GOLDFIELD, BLACK, WHITE, AND SOUTHERN: RACE RELATIONS AND
SOUTHERN CULTURE, 1940 TO THE PRESENT 45–46 (1990).
232. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 173 (2004).
233. See id. at 172–73
234. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 636 (1950).
235. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938) (holding that if a
state provides an in-state law school for White students, it must provide a substantially
equivalent in-state law school for Black students), abrogated by McLaurin v. Okla. State
Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (holding Oklahoma must provide qualified
Black people with in-state legal education that is not segregated).
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required the desegregation of libraries and classroom facilities.236
Segregation was tackled in other areas, also including housing,
transportation, and criminal procedure.237 The courts addressed
many cases involving race by unanimously overturning legal precedents set in the 1930s that established segregation.238
The Court decided these cases against a social and political backdrop that appeared to be open to racial reform.239 While the good
times were rolling for some in the 1950s, the reality for many Black
people, however, was that segregation was still a daily barrier generally, and in Richmond, Virginia, particularly. During this period
in its fight against segregation in Brown’s aftermath, the NAACP
pushed forward, much of its work remaining untold.240
A. Litigating Educational Justice in Virginia: 1961–2006
“[Those in power] are trying to build a Wall of China around Virginia while segregation is breaking down outside the state.”
—Oliver W. Hill 241

236. See TUSHNET, supra note 102, at 146.
237. Id. at 56, 86, 301–03.
238. See Gaines, 305 U.S. at 351; see also KLARMAN, supra note 232, at 173 (“Many of
these civil rights decisions were unanimous—a noteworthy accomplishment for a Court that
rarely managed to avoid dissent. Only in criminal cases, which were no longer as obviously
about race, was the Court’s record mixed. In other contexts, the justices seemed willing to
vindicate nearly any claim for progressive racial reform, even if doing so required considerable legal creativity.”).
239. See GOLDFIELD, supra note 231, at 45, 55.
240. The 1950 NAACP National Convention in Boston decided as an organization to challenge legal segregation wherever it persisted. See HILL, supra note 82, at 160; Separate Is
Not Equal: Brown v. Board of Education: A Turning Point in 1950, SMITHSONIAN NAT’L
MUSEUM AM. HIST., https://americanhistory.si.edu/brown/history/3-organized/turning-po
int.html [https://perma.cc/69VG-UYVY]; see also Tushnet, supra note 104, at 1693. Five desegregation suits were launched throughout different states in 1950s. See Timeline of Events
Leading to the Brown v. Board of Education Decision of 1954, NAT’L ARCHIVES (Aug. 15,
2016), https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/brown-v-board/timeline.html [https://
perma.cc/C59L-ZX3C]. See generally Charles W. Eagles, Toward New Histories of the Civil
Rights Era, 66 J.S. HIST. 815 (2000). See also Greenberg, supra note 23, at 119 (mentioning
a meeting with “W.E.B. Du Bois, Ralph Bunche, E. Franklin Frazier, Charles Thompson,
and others, at a 1935 meeting of black leaders and intellectuals, considered such possibilities as armed revolution, politics and courts” as grounds for social change; they ruled out
insurrection as a possibility because it was “self-destructive” and politics as a possibility
because “southern racists dominated national politics,” but thought courts a sound option,
more specifically the goal of integration in education (rather than challenging Plessy headon)).
241. “Wall Will Crumble”, BALT. AFRO-AM., Sept. 22, 1956, at 7.
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Hill, Spotswood Robinson, Marsh, and others would start to penetrate this wall.242 However, there was still much work to be done;
by the time Marsh began litigating in the early 1960s there were
laws put in place to support a white supremacist agenda to keep
Black people from voting, and state legislatures were proportioned
to help rural Whites.243 The battles waged by the Black Richmond
leaders continued for years.244
Marsh worked on more than fifty school cases as part of his fight
for educational equity.245 Many of his cases came from members of
the NAACP, making him part of a broader scheme of utilizing litigation to wield social change. Many of these cases were school
cases occurring during the height of Massive Resistance.246 Marsh
had a hand in cases that were critical to Virginia’s progress against
this resistance.247 As segregationists’ Massive Resistance efforts
continued, Marsh’s caseload would substantially increase between
1963 and the early 1970s.248 These years represented the height of
the modern civil rights era, and Marsh’s load of cases in federal
courts all around Virginia was reflective of this fact. The cases

242. See MARSH, supra note 1, at 5.
243. KLARMAN, supra note 232, at 192.
244. See generally EDDS, supra note 1.
245. Henry Marsh, III (1933– ), CHANGEMAKERS, LIBR. VA., https://edu.lva.virginia.
gov/changemakers/items/show/28 [https://perma.cc/W67E-RVFW].
246. See generally Bell v. Sch. Bd. of Powhatan Cnty., 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963); Beckett v. Sch. Bd. of Norfolk, 269 F. Supp. 118 (E.D. Va. 1967); Beckett v. Sch. Bd. of Norfolk,
302 F. Supp. 18 (E.D. Va. 1969); Beckett v. Sch. Bd. of Norfolk, 308 F. Supp. 1274 (E.D. Va.
1969); Betts v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Halifax, 269 F. Supp. 593 (W.D. Va. 1967); Bowman v. Cnty.
Sch. Bd. of Charles City, 382 F.2d 326 (4th Cir. 1967); CHRISTOPHER SILVER & JOHN V.
MOESER, THE SEPARATE CITY: BLACK COMMUNITIES IN THE URBAN SOUTH, 1940–1968 82
(1995) (noting that in Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, “the parents of ten black
children who had been denied admission to white schools filed a class action suit in U.S.
district court.”).
247. See Desegregation of Virginia (DOVE): Timeline, OLD DOMINION UNIV.,
https://www.odu.edu/library/special-collections/dove/timeline [https://perma.cc/65KJ-7YLS]
(explaining the timeline generally: in 1963, the Surry all-White public school converted to a
White-only private school and Surry County’s Black schools remained open; resistance to
desegregation lasted for the next decade; in 1964, the Supreme Court ordered Prince Edward County schools to reopen, the landmark 1964 Civil Rights Act passed, and public
schools are opened to Native Americans; by 1968, all public colleges admitted both Black
and White students, private colleges would follow, and the Supreme Court ended Greene
County’s “freedom of choice” plans; in 1969, Court ended state tuition grants, which cost
taxpayers about $20 million, to children attending segregation academies; in 1970, Governor Holton made a huge political statement by enrolling his children into previously all
Black schools in Richmond, VA and bussing initiatives began; in 1974, the Supreme Court
limited bussing in Richmond, VA. In 1986, Norfolk became the first city in the country to
end bussing for “racial balance;” in 1988, desegregation of U.S. public schools generally
peaked and schools in many cities became more segregated).
248. MARSH, supra note 1, at 54, 69.
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expanded from school cases to include employment,249 public accommodations, and voting rights cases also—however, this section
is limited to Marsh’s school cases. Even with the diverse types of
cases Marsh accepted, the caseload was low in his first two years
of practice, although meaningful.250
1. Marsh’s School Cases: 1961–1964
a. Overview
The years between 1959 and 1964 proved to yield the greatest
success for civil rights and NAACP lawyers. Some of the greatest
successes were in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit.251 In many of these early cases, district court
judges upheld school plans that on its face were not discriminatory
but rather propagated “token integration” or kept racial integration at a minimum.252 Marsh later challenged these rulings and
often won on appeal to the Fourth Circuit court, which forced
school boards to go back and create desegregation plans to integrate classrooms.253 There is a legal record of these lesser-known,
although significant, school cases that Marsh or his colleagues
worked on during this period.254 The first of these cases occurred
249. See id. at 54; Henry Marsh, III (1933– ), supra note 245. Outside of school cases,
Marsh also worked on employment and housing discrimination cases. Two of those cases—
Quarles v. Philip Morris (1967), an equal employment for minorities case, and Gravely v.
Robb (1981), which established single-member districts for the General Assembly—would
put Marsh on the map for being “one of the leading trial and appellate attorneys in Virginia.”
Id.
250. See MARSH, supra note 1, at 54. See generally Interview by Julian Bond with Henry
L. Marsh, III, supra note 94.
251. See MARSH, supra note 1, at 122–24.
252. J. KENNETH MORLAND, TOKEN DESEGREGATION AND BEYOND vi (1963).
253. MARSH, supra note 1, at 63.
254. See generally Bradley v. Richmond Sch. Bd., 416 U.S. 696, (1974); Gilliam v. Sch.
Bd. of Hopewell, 382 U.S. 103 (1965); Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of Richmond, 345 F.2d 310 (4th
Cir. 1965); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brewer v. Sch. Bd. of
Norfolk, 397 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1968); Brewer v. Sch. Bd. of Norfolk, 434 F.2d 408 (4th Cir.
1970); Brewer v. Sch. Bd. of Norfolk, 456 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1972); Brewer v. Sch. Bd. of
Norfolk, 500 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1974); Buckner v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Greene Cnty., 332 F.2d
452 (4th Cir. 1964); Calhoun v. Cook, 487 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1973); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Copeland v. Sch. Bd. of Portsmouth, 464 F.2d 932 (4th Cir.
1972); Dillard v. Sch. Bd. of Charlottesville, 308 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1962); Downing v. Sch.
Bd. of Chesapeake, 455 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1972); Franklin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Giles Cnty.,
242 F. Supp. 371 (W.D. Va. 1965); Gilliam v. Sch. Bd. of Hopewell, 345 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.
1965); Griffin v. Bd. of Supervisors of Prince Edward Cnty., 322 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1963);
Griffin v. Bd. of Supervisors of Prince Edward Cnty., 339 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1964); Griffin
v. State Bd. of Educ., 239 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Va. 1965); Green v. Sch. Bd. of Roanoke, 428
F.2d 811 (4th Cir. 1970); Greene v. Sch. Bd. of Alexandria, 494 F. Supp. 467 (E.D. Va. 1979);
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immediately following Brown, and many were related to tuition
grants.
b. Attacking Freedom of Choice Plans
In the early 1960s, the NAACP did not retreat from the resistance of the segregationists, and the organization continued its
crusade to desegregate schools.255 The Allen v. School Board of
Prince Edward County (1961) case involved a class suit against a
county school board to proceed with the county’s desegregation. 256
Marsh took this case a couple of years after the Brown decision.
The District Court gave the board seven years to put a desegregation plan in place, and the plaintiffs appealed.257 On appeal, the
court held that it was unacceptable to allow this inaction from the
school board. The court instead remanded the case to the District
Court to order the school board to immediately accept Black students’ applications.258 This order applied to elementary and high
schools.
This case demonstrates that while laws can change instantly, it
does not necessitate that ideologies also instantaneously shift. The
school board refused to operate public schools where Black and
White children learned together. When that did not work, they refused to levy school taxes and schools did not open that fall. Desegregation was supposed to be an immediate occurrence; however, it
Hart v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Arlington, 329 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Va. 1971); McLaurin v. Okla.
State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Medley v. Sch. Bd. of City of Danville,
350 F. Supp. 34 (W.D. Va. 1972); Medley v. Sch. Bd. of City of Danville, 482 F.2d 1061 (4th
Cir. 1973); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946); Norris v. State Council of Higher Educ.,
327 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va. 1971); Pettaway v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Surry, 230 F. Supp. 480
(E.D. Va. 1964); Riddick v. Sch. Bd. of Norfolk, 627 F. Supp. 814 (E.D. Va. 1984); Riddick v.
Sch. Bd. of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1986); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948);
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Thompson
v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Hanover, 252 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Va. 1966); Thompson v. Sch. Bd. of
Newport News, 465 F.2d 83 (4th Cir. 1972); Thompson v. Sch. Bd. of Newport News, 363 F.
Supp. 458 (E.D. Va. 1973); Thompson v. Sch. Bd. of Newport News, 498 F.2d 195 (4th Cir.
1974); Turner v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Goochland, 252 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Va. 1966); United
States v. Nansemond Cnty. Sch. Bd., 351 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Va. 1972); Walston v. Cnty.
Sch. Bd. of Nansemond, 492 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1974); Walston v. Sch. Bd. of Suffolk, 566
F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1977); Wilder v. Johnson Pub. Co., 551 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Va. 1982);
Wright v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Greensville, 252 F. Supp. 378 (E.D. Va. 1966); Wright v. Cnty.
Sch. Bd. of Greensville, 309 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Va. 1970).
255. See DAUGHERITY, supra note 4, at 138 (“Focusing on its strengths, the Virginia
NAACP also accelerated its efforts to bring about public school desegregation in the early
1960s.”).
256. 207 F. Supp. 349 (E.D. Va. 1962).
257. Allen v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward, 266 F.2d 507, 508, 510 (4th Cir. 1959).
258. Id. at 511.
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took longer than expected, and when it did, it often happened on
White citizens’ terms.
In Allen v. County School Board of Prince Edward County
(1962), there was an action seeking admission to public schools
based on a nondiscriminatory basis. 259 The court ruled in Marsh’s
favor that the public schools in Prince Edward County should not
be closed to avoid integration; these school closures were yet another resistance to school desegregation.
c. Attacking Pupil Placement Laws
Pupil placement laws were established in a special session of the
Virginia legislature in 1956.260 The act allowed a three-member
board to be formed that had the power to determine which students
or pupils could attend or transfer to specific schools.261 This was
one of many ways that segregationists would try to thwart integration. The conduct of segregationist school boards trying to evade
the law was often so outrageous that Marsh and other attorneys
would argue that the court should award civil rights lawyers appropriate attorneys’ fees.262 Marsh helped establish this precedent
in one of the first cases on the issue occurring in 1963 in Bell v.
School Board of Powhatan County.263 In Bell the school board hid
the pupil assignment forms to make the process for Black parents
wishing to register for a school where their student would not have
been able to register pre-Brown nearly impossible. The Fourth Circuit ruled in Bell that the school board would have to pay the plaintiff’s attorney fees because of the board’s blatant refusal to comply
with state law.264
The very idea that the General Assembly would require Black
parents to “make an application” for their children to attend an allWhite school rather than allowing them to register just like all the
259. 207 F. Supp. at 350.
260. See William G. Thomas, III, Television News of the Civil Rights Era 1950–1970:
Pupil Placement Board, UNIV. OF VA. (2005), https://www2.vcdh.virginia.edu/civilrights
tv/glossary/topic-017.html [https://perma.cc/J5M9-2ZJS].
261. Id.
262. MARSH, supra note 1, at 46.
263. 321 F.2d 494, 497, 500 (4th Cir. 1963). A class suit was instituted on behalf of children denied admission to a school because of their race. The court ordered that the children
should be admitted, and the board should submit a desegregation plan. The court agreed on
appeal and held that the school board was actively engaged in segregation because of students’ assignment by race. Id. The fight against segregation continued, and the school board
failed to implement the Brown decision principles. Id.
264. Id.
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other students was proof positive of the entire systems’ insolence
toward desegregation. Often this Pupil Placement Board decided
which “Negro students” could attend the previously all-White
schools and would usually deny the Black students’ application altogether.265
The Bell case is another example of case law that does not get
the same attention that the well-known sit-ins or bus boycotts have
in discussing civil rights activism. However, this case was responsible for the precedent that implemented a punitive consequence
for the school board’s participation in this type of behavior.266 Like
many others in Virginia and across the country, this school district
was still actively keeping Black students from attending schools
with White students nine years after the law mandated integration.267 Students’ perceptions of desegregation confirm that this legal schism caused distress to real children.268
This precedent set by Bell not only was the federal common law
standard, but subsequently spawned Congress to enact a statutory
provision in 1972 applying the Bell standard by authorizing discretionary awards of attorneys’ fees in similar school desegregation
cases.269 Virginia lawyers and other movement leaders’ purposeful
legal strategy was to attack Jim Crow in a place not reached by
other demonstrations that the CRM had implemented.270 Civil
rights attorneys like Hill, Robinson, Tucker, and Marsh were
charged with the task of taking Jim Crow down one case at a time.
Pupil placement forms were at issue in another significant case,
Bradley v. School Board of Richmond (1963), which mandated that
the school board create a policy that would erase discrimination

265. Thomas, supra note 260.
266. Bell, 321 F.2d 494.
267. See MARSH, supra note 1, at 46 (discussing how the school board hid pupil placement forms preventing schools in Powhatan from integrating. This occurred up until the
case was decided in 1963, nine years from Brown).
268. Sandra Morris Kemp, the first Black graduate of Powhatan High School, took the
time to study Massive Resistance. She “doesn’t remember experiencing a lot of overt racism
or hostility. However, . . . being the only black student in a class of 19 wasn’t easy.” Emily
Darrell, Former Students Look Back on Struggle to Integrate Schools, RICH. TIMESDISPATCH (Feb. 26, 2013), https://richmond.com/news/local/central-virginia/powhatan/
powhatan-today/former-students-look-back-on-struggle-to-integrate-schools/article_c4efc4e
2-805d-11e2-9ba4-001a4bcf6878.html [https://perma.cc/DWL8-CQWM]. She remembers it
being socially isolating as a result of “benign neglect.” Id. She hopes that these types of firsthand accounts of Virginia’s desegregation will not be lost in history. Id.
269. See Joan C. Koven, Note, Awarding of Attorneys’ Fees in School Desegregation
Cases: Demise of the Bad-Faith Standard, 39 BROOK. L. REV. 371 (1972).
270. See Darrell, supra note 268.
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patterns often involved in these school cases.271 The “freedom of
choice” policy was one that school boards used to appear as if they
complied with the law.272 However, the “freedom of choice” principle was discriminatory and overturned by one of Marsh’s most significant cases, the Green v. New Kent County case.273
d. Attacking Tuition Grants
There were a series of important rulings that came from Marsh’s
work on the Griffin cases.274 In Griffin v. Board of Supervisors of
Prince Edward County (1962), Marsh and the legal team filed a
petition to compel the Board of Supervisors to make available to
the school board sufficient funds for free public schools.275 The
court held that the Constitution did not allow for the school board
to raise taxes.276 The legislative branch of the government has the
power to maintain public free schools.277 This petition, if granted,
would be an invasion of the powers of the legislative branch.278 This
levying of taxes was a reaction to desegregation.279 This case shows
how far the resistance to desegregation could go.280

271. 317 F.2d 429, 438 (4th Cir. 1963).
272. Id. at 436–38.
273. 391 U.S. 430 (1968); see Larry M. Storm, Comment, Desegregation—The Times They
Are A-Changin’, 3 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 245, 254 (1975).
274. See Bd. of Supervisors v. Griffin, 8 Race Rel. L. Rep. 94, 109–10 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1963);
see also Griffin v. Bd. of Supervisors of Prince Edward Cnty., 322 F.2d 332, 334–36 (4th Cir.
1963) (This was an action to compel the local and state officials to create an efficient system
of schooling. On appeal, the order was vacated, and it was ruled that the county must reopen
schools as long as the public schools in the rest of the state should remain open. They held
that the district court should have waited on the state court determination of the validity of
closing the public schools.). In County School Board of Prince Edward County v. Griffin, 204
Va. 650, 133 S.E. 2d. 565 (1963), the court held that where the county board refused to
allocate the funds needed for the maintenance of schools, it was not the General Assembly’s
duty to take over the schools that had been closed and to operate them. The court also held
that the state law that closed the public schools, granted state and county tuition grants for
children who attend private schools, and made county’s tax concessions for those who make
contributions to private schools was valid. The court held that each county had the option
to operate or not to operate public schools. The Griffin v. County School Board of Prince
Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964), Court found that that the closing of public schools in
the county to avoid desegregation while using public funds to assist Caucasian students in
private segregated schools was a denial of Black student’s equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
275. 203 Va. 321, 322–23, 124 S.E.2d 227, 229 (1962).
276. Id. at 325–26, 124 S.E.2d at 231.
277. See supra note 24.
278. See supra note 24.
279. See supra note 221–22 and accompanying text.
280. In 1964, Marsh was involved with NAACP lawyers Frank D. Reeves and S.W.
Tucker in Prince Edward school litigation. See MARSH, supra note 1, at 117 (“In the 1960s,
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Meanwhile, by 1964 Prince Edward County’s public schools had
been closed for five years.281 Griffin v. County School Board of
Prince Edward County, another of Marsh’s cases, constituted a significant win for Prince Edward students.282 The Court ruled that
the county must reopen its public school doors as it violated students’ rights to an education.283 In the same year, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held in Brown v.
County School Board of Frederick County, Virginia (1964) that districts must abandon zone map assignment practices.284 Districts
could no longer require Black high school students to attend school
in a separate district so long as it created no serious administrative
problems.285
In Pettaway v. County School Board of Surry County (1964), the
Fourth Circuit ordered the school board to reopen its White
school.286 The court also held that the laws providing scholarships
and transportation grants were administered unconstitutionally
by the state and local officials.287 The grants were administrated in
the county where White public schools were closed and the Black
public schools remained open. A private school was organized, to
which all White students were applying, but no Black pupils were
admitted, and its students received scholarships and transportation grants to do so.288
Marsh saw the fruit of his labor in many cases in 1964, including
in Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County where
the court made a significant ruling in Marsh and his team’s favor
when they asked for the prohibition of tuition grants.289 The court
one struggle sought to overcome Massive Resistance. After Oliver left the firm in May 1961,
Tucker and I focused on that one. In Virginia, Tucker and I ended up carrying the ball on a
great team of attorneys from or affiliated with the Legal Defense Fund including Bob Ming,
Bob Carter, Connie Motley, Jim Nabrit, III, Jack Greenberg, Louis R. Lucas, Herb Reid,
Frank Reeves, and many others.”).
281. See id. at 68.
282. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
283. Id. at 225, 232–33 (stating that “closing the Prince Edward County schools while
public schools in all the other counties of Virginia were being maintained denied the petitioners and the class of Negro students they represent the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment”).
284. 327 F.2d 655, 655–56 (4th Cir. 1964).
285. Id.
286. 332 F.2d 457, 457–58 (4th Cir. 1964).
287. Id. at 458–59.
288. Id. at 458.
289. See Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 220–21, 224, 262 (1964); Griffin v. State
Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 1178, 1180 (E.D. Va. 1969); see also JEFFREY L. LITTLEJOHN &
CHARLES H. FORD, ELUSIVE EQUALITY: DESEGREGATION AND RESEGREGATION IN NORFOLK’S
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ordered retroactive tuition grants but not payments for the upcoming school year. They relied on the Supreme Court’s failure to rule
on tuition grants in Griffin as authority for his decision.290 On appeal, the Court consolidated the Prince Edward and Surry County
cases since they dealt with the same issues. In a separate case in
1964, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
ruled in Buckner v. County School Board (1964), that even though
the group of Black children seeking admission to a particular
school were placed in schools chosen by their parents or legal
guardians, the District Court failed to consider prayers for injunction against the operation of an integrated school system throughout county.291
2. Marsh’s School Cases: 1965–1969
a. Overview
Civil rights efforts related to school equalization garnered several significant victories between 1965 and 1969, and they occurred
in Virginia. The NAACP, beginning in 1965, shifted its attention
to bringing federal court cases challenging school districts’ failures
to desegregate their schools.292 Before initiating these cases, the
NAACP was unsuccessful in convincing Virginia school boards to
voluntarily create desegregation plans to allow Black students to
attend all-White schools.
A shifting change in the overall nation’s mood on racial matters
accompanied these substantial legal victories for desegregation.
Despite a national decline in civil rights enthusiasm, the federal
government worked in tandem with the state’s energetic NAACP
in 1965 and 1966.293 However, by 1967, the federal government’s
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 136–38 (2012) (discussing the progression of Marsh and teams’ Prince Edward and Surry County cases through the courts leading to Griffin v. State Board of Education (1965), which held that while tuition grants were not unconstitutional on its face,
that grants were impermissible if paid by the government knowing the funds would be used
to provide all or most of the cost of operations for segregated schools then. In Griffin v. State
Board of Education (1969), “the court held that recent decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court
provided a more stringent tuition grant standard, which outlawed any state-sponsored assistance to racially segregated schools”).
290. Griffin v. Bd. of Supervisors, 322 F.2d 332, 340 (4th Cir. 1963).
291. 332 F.2d 452, 453 (4th Cir. 1964).
292. DAUGHERITY, supra note 4, at 112.
293. Chinh Q. Le, Racially Integrated Education and the Role of the Federal Government,
88 N.C. L. REV. 725, 737 (2010) (“In just a few short years, primarily under the leadership
of the Johnson administration, the combined enforcement efforts of [the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (“HEW”)] and the Civil Rights Division of [the Department

1382

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1339

response to the deterioration in race relations was a less aggressive
attack on segregation. Because of this, Black plaintiffs and the
courts in Virginia had to take up the mantle of destroying segregation in the state’s most resistant regions, the cities, and the Black
belt.
In Virginia, the focus of the desegregation struggle was in Norfolk and Richmond. Judge Walter Hoffman faced difficult administrative problems in desegregating cities due to racial housing patterns.294 Judge Hoffman believed that the law’s requirements
should be adjusted to the situation.295 He also believed that desegregation would neutralize the effects of bussing. His position was
favored in the state but overruled by the higher courts. On the one
hand, to legal realists, this was a commonsense approach, but to
the Black plaintiffs, this meant Black children would be denied desegregated education.
Marsh’s work as a civil rights attorney fighting against Massive
Resistance also meant that he would have to identify all the cunning ways the Byrd Machine and other segregationist leaders
would try to skirt around school desegregation.296 These indirect
ways of evading the law would include “freedom of choice,” pupil
placement programs, and tuition grant programs.297 The local
Richmond community knew Marsh as a civil rights attorney who
addressed these issues. On one case, Marsh argued to a federal
panel that an appeals court’s ban on tuition grants in two Virginia
counties should be extended to the entire state’s “freedom of choice”
education program.298 Marsh was a part of a team of NAACP lawyers who submitted papers to the Richmond U.S. District Court
asking for tuition grant programs to be reviewed to determine
whether the state program violated the Constitution.299 The
NAACP lawyers argued that Virginia’s nine localities school
boards and the State Board of Education violated the Fourteenth

of Justice] transformed public education in the South. Between 1965 and 1970, HEW, initially independent, and later through its Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”), which was created
in 1967, ‘brought some 600 administrative proceedings against noncomplying school districts.’” (citation omitted)).
294. LITTLEJOHN & FORD, supra note 289, at 64.
295. Id. at 64–65.
296. See MARSH, supra note 1, at 46.
297. Id. at 44–45.
298. Court Asked to Ban All Tuition Grants, NEW J. & GUIDE (1916– ), Dec. 12, 1964, at
B9; see also LITTLEJOHN & FORD, supra note 289, at 136–37; MARSH, supra note 1, at 46.
299. LITTLEJOHN & FORD, supra note 289, at 136–38.
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Amendment because of state-sponsored acts of discrimination.300
Marsh and Tucker, therefore, filed an injunction asking for the
state to immediately cease and desist from paying tuition grants
for the upcoming school year.301 The three-judge panel consisting
of Judge John Butzner, Jr., Judge Albert Bryan, and Judge Walter
Hoffman all ruled in denial of the petition for injunction and instead scheduled a hearing for oral arguments for two months later
in December.302 Although Tucker made a solid case about why tuition grants that ensured children were not forced to attend integrated schools violated the Constitution and the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Brown, the Court was not convinced and in March ruled
tuition grants were “not unconstitutional on their face.”303 It would
take an additional four years before the same panel of judges would
rule again on this principle.304
b. Attacking Freedom of Choice Plans
In March of 1965, movement lawyers petitioned the court to
mandate school boards to desegregate their classrooms in eight
lawsuits. These lawyers planned to file fifty or more suits in Virginia until school boards were held accountable and required to
obey the spirit of Brown. At this point, the greatest threat to desegregation was the freedom of choice plan, which Marsh spent
much of his time fighting during Massive Resistance.305
While the freedom of choice plans did allow students to enroll in
their school of choice within a district, the burden of handling all
related logistics and hurdles was unfairly placed on the Black student and their families. The onus was on Black people to desegregate and not the schools’ districts. This was a problem for several
reasons, including that it was a great deal of pressure on Black
people to escape the harm of Jim Crow laws on their education.306
Several of Marsh’s cases attacked the freedom of choice plans
outside. The Bradley cases in both the Fourth Circuit and later the
Supreme Court dealt with whether the school board’s plan
300. Id. at 137–38.
301. Id. at 137.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 137–38.
304. Id.
305. See generally MARSH, supra note 1.
306. See generally id. (describing the challenges faced by Black Americans during the
litigation of school desegregation cases).

1384

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1339

hindered desegregation efforts. The Fourth Circuit upheld the
school board’s plan that gave every student the right to attend a
school of his or her choice, limited only by the time required for the
school’s transfers and the capacity to which the transfer was
sought.307 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacating and remanding the judgment, holding that parents and students were
entitled to evidentiary hearings based on their contention that the
faculty’s allocation was racially biased, which affected the student
assignment plans.308 The final Bradley decision was made in 1972,
the court ultimately held that school desegregation should be enforced, which would render all city schools racially identifiable. 309
The district court was forced to intervene to eliminate state-imposed segregation and eliminate the dual system to avoid a Fourteenth Amendment violation.310
Marsh brought an action on behalf of Black children to require
their transfer from Black public schools to White public schools in
Bradley v. School Board of Richmond (1965).311 The district court
ordered that the district transfer students to schools for which they
applied.312 On appeal, the Court held that the students were entitled to an injunction against the schools that maintained a discriminatory feeder system that allowed Black students to transfer to
White schools if they met a standard that other students were not
subjected to meet.313
Marsh was not as successful in Gilliam v. School Board of
Hopewell (1965). 314 The Fourth Circuit held that the district court
was correct in concluding that the school districts’ boundaries were
drawn based on geographic features and not on racial grounds.315
In Turner v. County School Board of Goochland County, the District Court in the Eastern District of Virginia held that a plan

307. Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of Richmond, 345 F. 2d 310 (4th Cir. 1965); see also Bradley v.
School Board of Richmond, 382 U.S. 103, 105 (1965), where the Court remanded the case to
the district court for full evidentiary hearings on this issue of a faculty desegregation plan
for Richmond which provided for recruitment and assignment policies aimed at desegregation.
308. Bradley, 382 U.S. at 105.
309. Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of Richmond, 338 F. Supp. 67, 114–15 (E.D. Va. 1972).
310. Id.
311. 382 U.S. 103.
312. Gilliam v. Sch. Bd. of Hopewell, 345 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1965), vacated, Bradley, 382
U.S. 103.
313. See Bradley, 382 U.S. at 103–05.
314. 345 F.2d 325, vacated, Bradley, 382 U.S. 103.
315. Id. at 327.
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adopted by the Goochland County School Board to desegregate
schools was invalid. 316 The plan’s provisions for staff desegregation
were too limited.317
In Wright v. County School Board of Greensville County, the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that a plan
which required mandatory choice to be made each year by both
White and Black students contained sufficient provisions for a successful transition of the Greensville county school system. 318 Still,
the plan’s provisions for staff desegregation were too limited.319 In
Thompson v. County School Board of Hanover County, the District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that a desegregation
plan which limited bus transportation to the nearest formerly
Black school or the nearest formerly White school and which required students to determine which school they would choose for
the new year by a cutoff date was invalid.320
In 1967, the District Court in the Western District of Virginia
held in Betts v. County School Board of Halifax County that a freedom of choice elementary school desegregation plan, which was
based on a policy of complete freedom of choice in assignments, was
constitutionally sufficient with a few additions. 321 This plan included annual freedom of choice for all students, both Black and
White, in every class in the entire county system.322
During this time, Marsh’s most important case was the landmark Green v. County School Board of New Kent County case,
which occurred in 1968 and ruled New Kent’s “freedom of choice”323
plan unconstitutional.324

316. 252 F. Supp. 578, 579, 582 (E.D. Va. 1966).
317. Id. at 582.
318. 252 F. Supp. 378, 379–80, 383 (E.D. Va. 1966).
319. Id.
320. 252 F. Supp. 546, 548, 551 (E.D. Va. 1966).
321. 269 F. Supp. 593, 596, 601–02 (W.D. Va. 1967).
322. Id.
323. 391 U.S. 430, 431–32 (1968). “Freedom of choice” meant choosing which school they
wanted to attend, often with the support of tuition grants. See The Virginia “Freedom of
Choice” School Plan, AM. ARCHIVE PUB. BROAD., at 12:23, 14:34 (Apr. 10, 1961), https://
americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip_28-z60bv7bg13 [https://perma.cc/NZ3H-T8E8].
324. Green, 391 U.S. at 441–42 (“The New Kent School Board’s ‘freedom-of-choice’ plan
cannot be accepted as a sufficient step to ‘effectuate a transition’ to a unitary system. In
three years of operation, not a single white child has chosen to attend Watkins school, and,
although 115 Negro children enrolled in New Kent school in 1967 (up from 35 in 1965 and
111 in 1966) 85% of the Negro children in the system still attend the all-Negro Watkins
school. In other words, the school system remains a dual system. Rather than further the
dismantling of the dual system, the plan has operated simply to burden children and their
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Ultimately the Court held that school boards must create unitary school systems because they had an “affirmative duty” to do
so.325 This ruling was important because the Supreme Court put to
rest the Briggs v. Elliot dictum. In Briggs, the court held that under Brown school boards only had a duty to prevent discrimination.326 School boards were only required to take steps to destroy
dual school systems. New Kent, a rural county in Eastern Virginia,
was trying to evade the Brown ruling by using this “freedom-ofchoice” plan wherein students could decide which of the two schools
in the county they wished to attend.327 Although the school district
was not preventing the White students from enrolling in the allBlack school, and vice versa, this choice plan undermined the
Court’s goal of desegregated schools. The NAACP attorneys on the
petitioners’ case were Oliver W. Hill, Samuel W. Tucker, and
Henry Marsh, with Tucker being the attorney who argued the
case.328
This social history provides background to cases that is unavailable in traditional legal records. Regarding the backstory to the
strategy behind Green, Marsh and the team sought out a case to
use as a pilot to completely overhaul legal precedent and lessen the
number of individual cases they would have to take.329 Of the
choices, including Charles City County and New Kent County, they
chose New Kent because New Kent only had two schools, one on
each end of the county, with children of both races represented.330
Marsh’s team chose New Kent because of the strict dichotomy
represented with just two school choices. New Kent clearly showed
that it bussed children past the schools they could otherwise have
attended except the children attending the schools were of a different race.331 By law and custom, the county had participated in

parents with a responsibility which Brown II placed squarely on the School Board. The
Board must be required to formulate a new plan and, in light of other courses which appear
open to the Board, such as zoning, fashion steps which promise realistically to convert
promptly to a system without a ‘white’ school and a ‘Negro’ school, but just schools.”).
325. Id. at 437–38.
326. Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
327. Green, 391 U.S. at 432–34.
328. Id. at 430; Jody Allen & Brian J. Daugherity, Green, Charles C. et al. v. County
School Board of New Kent County, Virginia, ENCYC. VA., https://encyclopediavirginia.org/
entries/green-charles-c-et-al-v-county-school-board-of-new-kent-county-virginia [https://per
ma.cc/ZW3J-H925].
329. MARSH, supra note 1, at 59–60.
330. Id. at 59.
331. Id.
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segregated schools for decades.332 The district bussed White children to the White school and bussed Black children to the Black
school.333
Oral historical accounts from persons active during the Movement help fill in parts of the historical narrative that are not easily
ascertained by reading the court transcripts. For instance, in the
Green case, through Marsh’s account, it is learned that one reason
why the NCAAP lawyers were able to win the case involved the
plaintiffs’ display of courage and the way they articulated their position.334 This case would become known in scholarship and the
community as equally if not more important than the Brown decision.335 Further, the case’s litigation strategy was born from an allnight work session on other matters when Marsh and Tucker realized it might prove worthwhile to challenge racial segregation in
the two New Kent schools.336 The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare used the Green decision as a model, which Marsh
suggests dramatically sped up desegregation in Virginia and the
rest of the South.337
Another important part of Marsh’s career as a civil rights lawyer
in the fight against Massive Resistance involved work that he and
Tucker did in Norfolk, Virginia. The NAACP requested that the
Hill, Tucker, and Marsh firm assist with multiple cases across the

332. Id.
333. Id. Marsh states, “These circumstances made New Kent the better litigation choice.
We could more easily challenge so called ‘freedom of choice’ where you had a white school
and a black school with forced bussing to maintain segregation. The Court couldn’t duck the
issue that freedom of choice did not lead to a desegregated school system with equal educational opportunities for all. . . . We filed suit in Green v. New Kent County. However, we
didn’t win it like we wanted to in the Fourth Circuit. The case went to the Supreme Court.”
Id. at 59–60.
334. Id.
335. See GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE 45 (2d ed. 2008) (quoting Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S.
430, 439 (1968)) (discussing the Green decision’s vital role in the fight for desegregation with
the Court for the first time since Brown, offering a detailed opinion on remedies and citing
the Green opinion: “The burden on a school board today is to come forward with a plan that
promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now”); see also David
Rhinesmith, Note, District Court Opinions as Evidence of Influence: Green v. School Board
and the Supreme Court’s Role in Local School Desegregation, 96 VA. L. REV. 1137, 1141
(2010); G. Robb Cooper & James Prescott, What Did Brown Do for You: Brown v. Board Fifty
Years Later, 14 LOY. PUB. INT. L. REP. 231, 232–33 (2009) (discussing Brown’s narrow scope
and how “[t]he Court in Green mandated that school districts had an affirmative duty to
desegregate. A plan must not merely address the issue of desegregation but effectively resolve it”).
336. MARSH, supra note 1, at 59–60.
337. Id. at 60.
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Commonwealth.338 Tucker decided that they should divide the
cases by region, asking Marsh to take Norfolk, Virginia.339 Marsh
was far enough into practice that he eagerly said he could take on
the Norfolk cases without issue, only expecting the caseload to last
for a couple of years.340 The work in Norfolk was much more substantial than Marsh realized at the time.341 Beginning on January
3, 1966, Marsh and the NAACP’s filed exceptions to the Norfolk
desegregation plan.342 This case was in response to the Norfolk
School Board’s desegregation plan filed with the U.S. District
Court on December 1, 1965, which raised concerns because it provided no room for desegregating the school district’s faculty.343
According to the plan, the district would integrate the school
population, and students would no longer be assigned based on
their race to either a White school or a Black school. Additionally,
any Black children who elected to go to a White school would be
allowed to do so. The plan sounded fair enough, but Marsh, who
served as the lead attorney, took exception to the proposal arguing
that it was unconstitutional because the faculty was not required
to be racially diverse.344 Further, under the school district’s proposal, it was improbable that Whites would ever elect to go to a
Black school, leaving the Black schools just as segregated as they
had started.345

338. Id. at 61.
339. Id.
340. See id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. See LITTLEJOHN & FORD, supra note 289, at 139 (“The Norfolk School Board filed
its modified desegregation plan with the U.S. District Court on December 1, 1965. . . . Despite the rosy picture presented by the school district, the NAACP filed exceptions to Norfolk’s desegregation plan on January 3, 1966. Led by attorney Henry Marsh, the NAACP
argued that Norfolk’s plan was unconstitutional because it failed to provide any program
from faculty desegregation. In addition, Marsh and his team cited specific problems with
the city’s pupil assignment plan. At the high school level, Maury, Granby, and Norview—
the three predominately white schools—had discrete geographic attendance zones, while
Booker T. Washington, the all-black school, drew students from the entire city. This attendance scheme made it unlikely that white students would ever transfer to Booker T. Washington, which was attended by all but 680 of the city’s 2,994 black high school students. At
the intermediate level, six of the city’s eleven junior high schools remained entirely segregated, while four additional junior high schools had 222 African Americans enrolled in classes with 5,898 white students. And finally, at the elementary level, at least thirty-one of the
city’s fifty-three primary schools remained entirely segregated. In sixteen of the remaining
twenty-two schools, racial minorities represented less than 5 percent of the total enrollment.”).
344. Id. at 142 (discussing the “difficult issue of faculty desegregation”).
345. See LITTLEJOHN & FORD, supra note 290.
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Initially, a federal district judge, Walter Hoffman, had called for
the desegregation of schools in Norfolk, and only a few Black students were admitted to the White school.346 Despite the sparse implementation of the desegregation ruling, there was a massive outcry by Whites in the community.347 When Marsh and his team
tackled the issues regarding the integration of Black and White
faculty members working in the same schools and further integrating the student population, Hoffman would rule against them.348
But as it happened, there was a turn of events.
At one point, Judge Hoffman went out of town to try a case in
Nevada.349 As it happened, a case on desegregation came up on the
docket.350 Marsh persuaded the presiding judge who was sitting in
for Hoffman, Judge John MacKenzie, to rule in favor of desegregation, “with a ratio of 58% black to 42% white throughout the school
system for both teachers and students.”351 This decision turned the
tables for the entire school system, marking a significant rulings
towards schools’ actual desegregation.
Litigation continued into 1969 with Beckett v. School Board of
Norfolk. 352 The court held that implementing constitutional principles on good faith does not require racial balancing in each
school.353 In Griffin (1969), an iteration of the case mentioned
above, the court ruled in Marsh’s favor that it is illegal and against
students’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to have laws in place that
preclude students from attending integrated schools.354
In Nesbit v. Statesville City Board of Education, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that school districts must eliminate schools’ racial characteristics.355 The districts must do so
through “pairing, zoning, consolidation, . . . or any other method
that may most effectively provide a unitary school system.”356 In
addition, school districts must integrate faculty in schools so that
346. MARSH, supra note 1, at 61.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 62.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 61, 63.
351. Id. at 63.
352. 308 F. Supp. 1274, 1276 (E.D. Va. 1969).
353. Id. at 1279.
354. Griffin, 296 F. Supp. at 1180–81; LITTLEJOHN & FORD, supra note 289, at 138.
Marsh’s work on the Griffin case offers insight into an issue that held significant weight in
Virginia’s school battle.
355. 418 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1969).
356. Id. at 1042.
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each school’s ratio of Black and White faculty members reflects the
school district’s approximate ratio.357 That same year in Walker v.
County School Board of Brunswick County, the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit held that school districts where Black students were the substantial majority were not entitled to utilize
freedom of choice methods in integrating the schools. 358
c. Equalization of Teachers’ Salaries
In Franklin v. County School Board of Giles County, Marsh sued
the Board and the Division Superintendent of Schools of Giles
County on behalf of seven Black teachers that the County School
Board of Giles County fired.359 These teachers were discharged
when the Board had abandoned two Black schools and had integrated the students and their teachers’ association.360 The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that these teachers were fired
because of their race, as evidenced by the Board employing eight
new White teachers in the county school system.361 As a result, the
Black teachers were entitled to a mandatory injunction requiring
their reinstatement. They were also entitled to reemployment in
any vacancy that they were qualified for in terms of certification or
experience.362
3. Marsh’s School Cases: 1970–2006
a. Overview
As might be expected, Whites at high levels of leadership were
conspicuously quiet when it came to the issue of desegregation.
Possibly, they were afraid of the backlash, like in Judge Hoffman’s
case, if they dissented from the status quo on the issue.363 This
changed with Governor Linwood Holton, who served as Virginia’s
governor from 1970 to 1974.364 Marsh had supported his election.365
357. Id.
358. 413 F.2d 53 (4th Cir. 1969).
359. 360 F.2d 325, 325 (4th Cir. 1966).
360. Id. at 326.
361. Id. at 326–27.
362. Id. at 327.
363. See MARSH, supra note 1, at 62.
364. See id. at 67; Clay Risen, Linwood Holton, 98, Virginia Governor Who Pushed for
Racial Equality, Dies, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/01/
us/linwood-holton-dead.html [https://perma.cc/2EDH-ZESZ].
365. MARSH, supra note 1, at 67.
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After he was appointed Governor, Marsh requested Holton’s help
with advancing the cause of desegregation.366 Holton did so by
making an extraordinarily daring move; he enrolled his daughter,
Tayloe, in the poorest school in the city.367 It made the front page.368
b. Attacking Taxpayer Funding of Segregated Schools
Another example of the types of desegregation cases Marsh handled dealt with overturning taxpayer funding of segregated academies.369 To force litigation against the public financing of private
all-White academies in Surry County, which served to allow
Whites to skirt the mandate to desegregate public schools, he purposely had Black students seek admission into the all-White academy.370 Of course, these White schools denied the Black students’
applications.371 Marsh then brought individual lawsuits on behalf
of those Black students.372 He and his team also brought legal action against the State Board of Education to prevent tuition grants
and Pupil Placement Boards from denying Black students’ entrance to White schools on fallacious grounds.373 Eventually, the
pupil placement process was deemed invalid.374
c. Attacking Freedom of Choice Plans
Marsh’s team brought additional Bradley cases before the courts
in two separate cases, one known as Bradley I (1973) and the other
Bradley II (1972 and 1974). The Bradley litigation first proposed a
new plan to bring three Richmond districts together to force desegregation. However, the Court ruled that it did not have the authority to enact this plan.375 In Bradley II, which made it to the Supreme Court, the ruling reversed the attorneys’ fees awarded to
the plaintiffs at the trial level.376 Attorneys for the plaintiffs
366. See id.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 45.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. See id.
373. See id.; LITTLEJOHN & FORD, supra note 289, at 136–38.
374. MARSH, supra note 1, at 45–46.
375. Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of Richmond, 462 F.2d 1058, 1069 (4th Cir. 1972), aff’d by an
equally divided court, Sch. Bd. of Richmond v. State Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 92 (1973).
376. Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of Richmond, 53 F.R.D. 28 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev’d, Bradley v. Sch.
Bd. of Richmond, 472 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1972), vacated, Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of Richmond,

1392

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1339

involved in the earlier Bradley cases were Tucker and Marsh; the
LDF took over the later appeals.377
The next year, in Brewer v. School Board of Norfolk, which was
a continuation of the Beckett case, Marsh sued Norfolk to force
them to integrate its schools truly. 378 The court held that the school
desegregation plan that assigned Black students to all-Black
schools, White students to an all-White school, and allowed segregated schools to remain open pending construction was constitutionally impermissible.379 After this and subsequent decisions,
many detailed below, Norfolk would begin to actually integrate.
In Wright v. County School Board of Greensville County (1970),
the District Court in the Eastern District of Virginia held that districts must reject proposals where the approval of a city’s proposal
for a separate school system would have affected the entire
county’s desegregation plan. 380 Further, if the proposal created city
schools with about equal numbers of Black and White students,
but county schools with a ratio of seven Black students to three
White students, then such a proposal must be rejected.381
Again, the Fourth Circuit ruled in favor of active desegregation
in Green v. School Board of City of Roanoke (1970).382 The court
held that initially assigning children to schools on a segregated basis, requiring Black children to live nearer to White schools and to
be well above the median of a White school to seek admission was
a violation of Black students’ Fourteenth Amendment rights.383

416 U.S. 696 (1974).
377. MARSH, supra note 1, at 54, 56–57. Marsh attributed the loss in the Fourth Circuit
on Bradley II to a weak argument in court. See Jim McElhatton, Standing on the ‘Shoulders
of Bob Ming,’ WASH. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2008), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/
dec/7/standing-on-the-shoulders-of-bob-ming [https://perma.cc/SZ96-WFES]. Bob Ming was
the first Black professor at the University of Chicago School of Law and a partner in a private law firm. The NAACP honors lawyers with an award in Mr. Ming’s name and describes
Ming as one of the primary architects in the Brown v. Board of Education litigation. Id.; see
also MARSH, supra note 1, at 117. The Richmond Times Dispatch and other papers often
reported Marsh’s civil rights work including his participation on the Prince Edward cases
where Marsh called the budget for schools “inadequate.” Pr. Edward’s Jimcro Plans Back
in Court, NEW J. & GUIDE (1916– ), July 4, 1964, at 1.
378. 434 F.2d 408 (4th Cir. 1970).
379. Id. at 410–11.
380. 309 F. Supp. 671, 680–81 (E.D. Va. 1970), rev’d sub nom., Wright v. Council of Emporia, 442 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1971), rev’d, 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
381. See id. at 678–79, 681.
382. 428 F.2d 811 (4th Cir. 1970).
383. Id.
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In 1972, the Fourth Circuit held in Copeland v. School Board of
Portsmouth that when student assignments are made to special
schools to benefit students with learning disabilities, these assignments are not scrutinized under equal protection strictly on the
basis that these special schools are not racially balanced.384 In Hart
v. County School Board of Arlington County, the Fourth Circuit
held that the proposed unitary school system plan was not discriminatory on the basis of race.385 Fewer Black students were transported than White students. Black students faced greater travel
time, and formerly all-Black elementary schools continued as special purpose schools to which predominantly White student populations would be transported.386 The court ruled that this plan was
not discriminatory on the theory that the burden of transfer and
transportation fell more heavily on Black students.387
Also in 1972, the District Court for the Western District of Virginia held in Medley v. School Board of Danville that a school desegregation plan requiring hundreds of young children to cross a
highly congested and hazardous passageway at its busiest time
without proper bridges, sidewalks, and other safety provisions was
a good enough reason to leave the one fifth and one sixth grade
student from each side of city and kindergarten through fourth
grades in neighborhood schools.388 The facts made it impracticable
to implement a program of bussing and cross bussing.
By 1973, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
in Calhoun v. Cook held that under the circumstances, the case
could not be adjudicated on constitutional grounds and that a remand was required for further proceedings as to the right to intervene and the approval of the school desegregation plan.389 The next
year in 1974 in Walston v. County School Board of Nansemond
County, the Fourth Circuit held a testing requirement discriminatory that had resulted in the elimination of more Black teachers
than White teachers.390 Further, the test did not purport to measure or predict classroom teaching skills; therefore, the court held

384. 464 F.2d 932 (4th Cir. 1972), supplemented sub nom, Thompson v. Sch. Bd. of Newport News, 472 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1972).
385. 459 F.2d 981 (4th Cir. 1972).
386. Id. at 982.
387. Id.
388. 350 F. Supp. 34, 49–50 (W.D. Va. 1972).
389. 487 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1973).
390. 492 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1974).
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the use of a cutoff score of five hundred was patently arbitrary and
discriminatory.391
After eighteen years of litigation in the courts, Marsh made progress towards really desegregating Virginia’s schools, but there
was still much more work to do. In cities where bussing counted
for the largest increase in desegregation, predominantly Black
schools existed, and White flight threatened to increase their numbers. In Black belt counties and large cities, the future of integration was threatened by the present desegregation obstacles, despite rosy statistics.
In Greene v. School Board of Alexandria (1980), the District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that closing specific
elementary schools was based on legitimate reasons and was not
proven to have a racially discriminatory impact. 392 Despite a claim
that school closings caused a burden on Black students, it required
bussing to remaining schools.393
In 1986, the Fourth Circuit was still ruling on these school desegregation cases. In Riddick by Riddick v. School Board of Norfolk, Marsh represented parents of public school children and sued
the school board in Norfolk, challenging the constitutionality of a
new proposed student assignment plan that restricted elementary
school children’s crosstown bussing.394 The U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia held that precedent in previous desegregation cases required plaintiffs to have the burden of proving
intent to discriminate, and plaintiffs failed to sustain that burden.395
Marsh’s cases carried over into the twenty-first century with
Walton v. School Board of Gloucester County. In this case, Marsh,
on behalf of Plaintiff Walton, filed an employment discrimination
action against Gloucester County Public Schools for continuously
denying her applications despite being a qualified teacher.396 The
U.S. District Court in the Eastern District of Virginia granted
Gloucester’s motion to dismiss this case. In the same year, the
Fourth Circuit ruled on Cuffee v. Tidewater Community College
391. Id. at 925–26.
392. 494 F. Supp. 467, 473 (E.D. Va. 1979), aff’d sub nom., In re Greene, 634 F.2d 622
(4th Cir. 1980).
393. Id.
394. 627 F. Supp. 814, 816, 819 (E.D. Va. 1984), aff’d, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1986).
395. Id. at 827.
396. No. 06cv75, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87477, at *2 (Dec. 4, 2006) (unpublished).
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against a community college employee who sued Tidewater Community College for employment discrimination based on race and
alleged retaliation for previous EEOC complaints.397 The U.S. District Court in the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed Marsh’s
case on a motion for summary judgment and the Fourth Circuit
affirmed.398
B. Legislating Educational Justice in Virginia: 1969–2014
“Without question, the increased activism of the 1950s and 1960s
spilled over into politics as previously disengaged blacks, emboldened by courtroom legislative triumphs, began to believe that ‘black
power’ could be translated into meaningful reform.”
—Roger Biles 399
Since he was a young boy, Marsh’s career plan did not involve
becoming a civil rights lawyer or politician. Instead, Marsh
planned to become a truck driver.400 Marsh, a young boy who
walked several miles to school one way in a racially segregated
southern town, saw only three career options: becoming an oysterman like his uncle, farming, or driving trucks like those that traveled up and down the country back roads of Isle of Wight County.401
It was not until high school that Marsh would consider becoming a
lawyer and not until later in his legal career that he considered
politics.402
During the late 1960s, the approach to dismantling Jim Crow
laws focused on changing the law and creating a legal precedent
that would protect Black Americans’ rights. This strategy took
shape in many forms. By the election of President Kennedy in
1960, civil rights had become a central issue in American politics. Despite over seventy percent of Black votes, Kennedy was still
hesitant to push a civil rights agenda, fearing he would alienate
his southern base.403 However, he still appointed record-breaking
397. 194 F. App’x 127, 128 (4th Cir. 2006).
398. Id.; Cuffe v. Tidewater Cmty. Coll., 409 F. Supp. 2d 709, 721 (E.D. Va. 2006).
399. Roger Biles, Black Mayors: A Historical Assessment, 77 J. NEGRO HIST. 109, 114
(1992) (emphasis added).
400. MARSH, supra note 1, at 169.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. The Modern Civil Rights Movement and the Kennedy Administration, JOHN F.
KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM, https://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/
Civil-Rights-Movement.aspx [https://perma.cc/M2NZ-3W25].
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numbers of Blacks to high-level positions.404 Further, Kennedy allocated resources to the Civil Rights Commission and pushed legislation, although he did not take the lead. Kennedy was a proponent of school desegregation and gave special attention to many
social issues facing Black Americans like voting rights and employment discrimination.405
Although 1954 was a pivotal year in the CRM, 1963 ushered in
an era of civil rights legislation. The March on Washington in 1963
helped lay the foundation for the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Voting
Rights Act of 1965, and other demonstrations that took place all
over the South. 406 Led by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), Congress of Racial
Equality (CORE), and other organizations, the Movement had momentum.
It would not be until the mid to late 1970s that Blacks demonstrated or showed Richmond’s political independence.407 Research
shows that the noticeable gains in Black public office-holding during this time were at the mayoral level,408 which is significant because the mayoral position is arguably the highest degree of local
empowerment that most often signals high degrees of organization
and control over local decision making among Black elites. To add
to this suggestion, on the alternative, when there is a lack of Black
representation in public office, there is often a heightened distrust
of the local government, which creates unrest.409

404. Id.
405. Id.
406. See generally Rebecca E. Zietlow, To Secure These Rights: Congress, Courts and the
1964 Civil Rights Act, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 945, 946 (2005) (arguing that “[t]he 1964 Act
provides an excellent example of congressional construction of constitutional norms, and it
is a landmark statue that effected constitutional change”). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
pivotal to the CRM’s agenda and for outlawing segregation. See id. It is also important to
note, however, that while it is tempting to look at the Act as an end of an era of the old
Southern racial caste system, it actually served as the impetus for the renewal of a movement for race and equity. See Kenneth W. Mack, Foreword: A Short Biography of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 67 SMU L. REV. 229, 229–30 (2014). Mack also reminds us that the Act
was the result of a long history of protest and civic engagement, the broader movement
having played a significant role. See id. If we are not careful, however, the United States
government can undermine the “principle jurisprudential foundations” of the Act. See Jonathan K. Stubbs, Modern “Sappers and Miners”: The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts and the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 18 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 461, 462 (2015).
407. CHRISTOPHER SILVER & JOHN V. MOESER, THE SEPARATE CITY: BLACK
COMMUNITIES IN THE URBAN SOUTH, 1940–1968 12–13, 76–77 (2015).
408. Id. at 11.
409. See F. Glenn Abney & John D. Hutcheson, Jr., Race, Representation, and Trust:
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The Voting Rights Act in 1965 would come full circle twelve
years after its ratification when Richmond would break all records
by voting in a city council that was majority Black.410 1965 was also
the same year that marked a historically significant moment of
what some called “Black political independence.”411 After the Voting Rights Act was passed, Blacks were able to mobilize politically
and freely exercise their rights to vote in large numbers once legal
barriers at the state and local level impeding this Fifteenth
Amendment right were removed. Within a few years of the Act’s
passage, in the South, the number of Blacks registered to vote increased exponentially.412 The Voting Rights Act, which Virginia
was part of, was important because it provided a golden opportunity for more people to participate in politics. The result was
greater participation of Blacks in the June 14, 1966 election when
Marsh ran for and was elected to city council.413
Marsh’s decision to become a civil servant is another area where
his personal life impacted his professional behavior. Marsh initially got involved in politics and legislation because no one else
would do so. Marsh was actively seeking several of his peers to run
for city council because he felt there was a great need for better
representation in Richmond’s local politics.414 Marsh could not persuade L. Douglas Wilder or any of his contemporaries at the time
to run for city council, and Marsh was running up against deadlines.415 So, he decided to do it himself. He was disgusted at the
Black council members already holding seats whose position was
that everything was fine in Richmond’s Black communities and
went along with the White power structure.416 Marsh knew that
everything was not fine in the local Black community. From
Changes in Attitudes after the Election of a Black Mayor, 45 PUB. OP. Q. 91, 91–92 (1981).
410. See Julian Maxwell Hayter, From Intent to Effect: Richmond, Virginia, and the Protracted Struggle for Voting Rights, 1965–1977, 26 J. POL’Y HIST. 534, 554 (2014).
411. See SNCC: What We Did, STUDENT NONVIOLENT COORDINATING COMM. (SNCC)
LEGACY PROJECT, https://www.sncclegacyproject.org/we-were-sncc/what-we-did [https://per
ma.cc/XZ7P-6C3E].
412. Id. at 539.
413. New Council, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, July 2, 1966, at 4; see also City Councilmanic
Campaign Draws Readers Comments, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, June 10, 1966, at 22 (“Henry
L. Marsh, III is an independent candidate who will bring to a deliberative body new, progressive and provocative ideas which will inure to the great benefit of the people and, if he
finds himself on a ‘team’, will make the plays which are called for him by the people.”). This
was the tone with which Marsh began his political career. Years later some would point to
his inability to work on a “team” as one possible reason his term as mayor ended.
414. MARSH, supra note 1, at 84–85.
415. Id.
416. Id.
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personal experience, Marsh could see what was coming next, and
often integrated this insight into his litigation strategy. He saw the
need for independent confident voices in policy making so he became one. He patterned himself after Hill, and therefore did not
necessarily return to Richmond for politics, but he was willing to
fill the void for the voice he thought necessary to help Richmond’s
Black communities.417 Marsh ran for City Council thinking that he
would only serve for two years, but ended up staying in some form
of public office for twenty-five years.418
One of Marsh’s motivations for being dogmatically uncompromising on some social issues was his belief that Black people were
serving on the City Council who claimed they were for the Black
community but held positions counter to their Black constituency.419 One example Marsh recounts is Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr.’s assassination on April 4, 1968, in Memphis, Tennessee. Marsh
asked City Council to allow the school children to view and hear
Dr. King’s televised funeral based on the assertion that King’s assassination not only significantly affected Black children but all
children country-wide.420 City Council, including the other two
Black Council members, voted down the proposal to allow students
to watch King’s funeral in the schools.421 The board denied the request because King was a Baptist, and watching the funeral would
violate the separation of church and state.422 Their logic confounded Marsh since John Kennedy was a Catholic, and students
were allowed to watch his funeral after his assassination.423 Marsh
felt that the other Black council members were not willing to push
back against double standards and the White majority’s oppressive
views.
In his new seat on City Council, Marsh began to fight against
the system created by those like Mr. Byrd and Mr. Robertson, who
“fanatically opposed [the] progress of the colored man throughout
their political lives.”424 Though only one of a number of his goals
for social change, Marsh was purposeful in his focus to destroy the
417. Id. at 85–88.
418. Id. at 85, 87–88.
419. Id. at 84–85.
420. Id. at 89.
421. Id.; see also James Woodson, Council Backs Open Housing, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH,
Apr. 9, 1968, at 1.
422. MARSH, supra note 1, at 89.
423. Id.
424. Let’s Vote as Citizens—Not as Whites or Negroes, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, July 8,
1966, at 24.
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Byrd Machine. Marsh learned while working at the Department of
Labor that there were checks to see if the federal government was
indeed discriminating against Blacks following Kennedy’s election.425 Marsh made note that there were no such checks under the
leadership of Kennedy’s predecessor, President Eisenhower.426 This observation made clear to Marsh the realization
that “who wins an election does matter.”427 On the other hand, soon
after taking his seat on Council, Marsh addressed those in the
crowd who were under fifty years old at the dedication of the Bill
Robinson Playground, stating, “just because we are able to put people on City Council doesn’t mean our problems are over.”428
Marsh was elected again in the 1968 elections and chosen for
Vice-Mayor in 1970.429 In 1977 Marsh became the first Black
mayor of Richmond.430 Marsh was elected, in part, because the
nine-member city council in 1977 was majority Black for the first
time in Richmond’s history.431 In 1970, Tom Bliley became the
mayor and recommended Marsh for Vice-Mayor; it was their practice that at-large City Council members elected the mayor and
vice-mayor from those already selected.432 As Vice-Mayor, Marsh
represented the City at the state and national levels by serving as
a board member for the National League of Cities. After becoming
Mayor, Marsh also chaired the Arts and Cultural Committee, one
of the four standing committees for the United States Conference
of Mayors.433
This racial shift in Richmond politics resulted from the city’s
growing Black population, higher Black voter turnout and registration, and legal remedies that handcuffed the hands of Jim
Crow. With a Black majority and Marsh at the wheel, the power
shift signaled to the business and White elite that things were
about to change.434

425. Oliver Hill later campaigned for President Kennedy’s brother, Jack Kennedy.
MARSH, supra note 1, at 12, 14.
426. Id. at 12.
427. Id.
428. Civic Involvement Urged by Councilman, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, July 29, 1966, at
2.
429. MARSH, supra note 1, at 90.
430. Id. at 104.
431. Marsh Seen as Choice to Become New Mayor, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 2, 1977,
at 1.
432. MARSH, supra note 1, at 90.
433. Id. at 91.
434. See id. at 95–96.
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When Marsh first started practicing law in 1961, Blacks had few
opportunities to participate in politics.435 Marsh was first introduced to the idea after his former classmate at Howard Law,
Vernon Jordan, connected Marsh to the Southern Regional Council, based in Atlanta.436 Jordan’s idea was to have Blacks in some
form of leadership on the Council.437 The Southern Regional Council was a group of segregationist leaders who advocated for disenfranchised persons of color.438 Therefore, after being oriented into
law with Tucker in Richmond, one of Marsh’s first orders of business was to go to Atlanta to begin networking. Little did he know,
this would pave his path into politics.
Marsh also participated as a Board member of the Voter Education Project under Jordan, Wylie Branton’s predecessor.439 During
Marsh’s terms as a Councilman, he championed educational progress proposals, including opposing a school budget cut and instead
allocated two million dollars to build the city’s educational program.440 Marsh and B. Addison Cephas Jr. pushed for an increase
in pay for school custodial personnel, where wages started at less
than $2,500 per year.441 During Marsh’s terms on Council, he practiced law, taking school cases in many parts of Virginia.442 The
number of school cases began to come at an increasingly slower
pace.443 Marsh served as a member of the city council for eleven
years, was appointed Vice-Mayor in 1970, and became the first
Black mayor of Richmond in 1977.444 His mayorship was a pinnacle
of local and state politics. It represented a shift in politics for a city
that had formerly served as the Confederacy’s capital.445
After reflecting on his time in office, Marsh realized that navigating Virginia’s racial politics and political arenas, in general, requires a thoughtful approach. Marsh was an accommodationist
leader because he was not afraid of working with all sides to meet
435. Biles, supra note 399, at 109.
436. MARSH, supra note 1, at 83.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. City Budget May Draw Fire at Hearing Tomorrow Night, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH,
May 3, 1967, at 16.
441. Id.
442. MARSH, supra note 1, at 84.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 90, 104; see also Interview by Julian Bond with Henry L. Marsh, III, supra
note 94.
445. Capital Cities of the Confederacy, AM. BATTLEFIELD TR., https://www.battle
fields.org/learn/articles/capital-cities-confederacy [https://perma.cc/D62Q-YFZX].
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his objectives. Occasionally, Marsh would find that his perceived
“enemies’’ were not enemies at all; other times, he would find that
there was no room for agreement.446 In those cases, he had them
close enough to monitor their behavior to inform preemptive counterattacks. It was not unusual to find Mayor Marsh playing tennis
with White politicians to gain their support while at the same time
rallying Black support to pass legislation that would move his
agenda for social progress forward.447 It was also often the case
that Marsh found his way into affluent inner circles to increase his
political reach.448
This strategy of using a second prong, legislation, to effect social
change was necessary. Massive Resistance occurred after civil
rights lawyers went through the effort to educate the public and
the judiciary about the problems of discriminatory laws that perpetrated inequity in education and the blatant way school districts
and other entities ignored new segregation laws. Marsh realized
this and shifted from movement lawyering to legislating laws.
Marsh committed himself fully as a civil rights lawyer, elected official, and leader of the Movement to change the law, reform the
law, and promote educational equity.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Marsh’s story as a Movement Lawyer is now told. In this Part, I
conclude by offering the implications of this story, drawing lessons
for those working for educational equity and those interested in
contributing to social movements more broadly. The Part further
answers why movement lawyering is important not just theoretically but practically. Marsh’s story offers insight about lawyering
and the legal profession. It also speaks to legal and political interventions related to effectuating just educational practices.
A. Strategies of Movement Lawyering
This Article tracks Marsh’s school cases litigated from 1959 to
1975, a great majority being in the Fourth Circuit. Marsh’s firsthand account of his strategies related to enforcing integration laws
required offer meaningful insights. These strategic notes and

446. MARSH, supra note 1, at 33.
447. Id. at 93.
448. Id. at 92–94.
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backstories that were not prevalent in the case law itself reveals
how school districts often side-stepped integration through school
closures and the presence of administrative red tape. Marsh’s personal accounts are useful for understanding how to think about
lawyering as a process.
Movement lawyering is different from other types of law practice, often using legal and political strategies to advance public interest advocacy.449 Litigation brought about by movement lawyers
as well as the strategies that they employ have, out of necessity,
unique features.450 This narrative demonstrates that Marsh did
not see himself as a savior, but rather as a member of a greater
community. There were also heroic elements that motivated the
zeal that encompassed the heart of Marsh as a movement lawyer.
Marsh revered the practice of law and considered it an esteemed
privilege to wield his status as an attorney to help his people advance beyond the strongholds of systemic oppression. This is an
important point for contemporary lawyers interested in this work.
In the case of achieving educational equity for Black Americans
in the Commonwealth of Virginia in the face of massive resistance,
the source of oppression included segregationist policy makers and
individual school systems in Virginia’s localities. Marsh’s work
highlighted these strategies, which included freedom of choice
plans that were used to deny the full implementation of desegregation rulings by purposefully encumbering the admission processes for Black children.451 Thus, only a token few were admitted
to White schools. Tuition grants were another tool used to deny the
implementation of laws calling for integration. These grants allowed for the use of public funding to pay for private schools for
White children.452 Another key strategy of segregationists was the
use of pupil placement laws, which divested local school boards of
the power to assign children to schools. This function was transferred to the State Board of Education. This tool was used to facilitate an extremely slow process. If left unchecked, this process
would have taken as much as “four thousand years” to achieve complete integration.453
449. See Susan D. Carle & Scott L. Cummings, A Reflection on the Ethics of Movement
Lawyering, 31 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 447 (2018).
450. See Cummings, supra note 125, at 1690.
451. See supra sections III(A)(2)(b), III(A)(3)(c).
452. See supra section III(A)(1)(d).
453. Ralph Lee Smith, The South’s Pupil Placement Laws: Newest Weapon Against Integration, COMMENT. MAG. (Oct. 1960), https://www.commentary.org/articles/ralph-smith/
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Litigation was the primary means by which the NAACP would
counter these segregationists’ strategies. The struggle for civil
rights is long. While slavery was formally abolished in 1865, Jim
Crow laws were enacted immediately thereafter and operated as a
legal form of keeping freed Black people from participating as
equal members of society.454 Thus, Black people had never known
what it was like to have equality in mainstream America. It may
be surmised that Black people at-large held little hope for the
achievement of true freedom. This bit of historical context helps
one to understand that the cases brought against the educational
establishment by movement lawyers like Marsh were part of a
greater effort to enact change for the greater good. This desire kept
these underpaid and overworked movement lawyers motivated.
The desire in contemporary movement lawyers for social justice is
not useless, but cam be harnessed to develop the requisite “staying
power” necessary to see small manifestations of social change.455
B. Staying Power
Marsh also recalled how one edge they had over the opposition
was “staying power,” meaning Marsh and Tucker could outlast the
defendants in these cases.456 One of Marsh’s Norfolk multi-year
cases lasted almost twenty years, starting in 1963 and ending in
1982.457 Marsh’s strategy for agitating injustice was securing
rights by winning cases and creating new legal precedents. Scholars debate whether litigation is an effective strategy for effectuating change before the 1970s. Some scholars suggest that using litigation to secure rights is a “myth of rights” because even if the
courts mandate social equality, it may not be carried out by other
government branches.458
the-souths-pupil-placement-lawsnewest-weapon-against-integration [https://perma.cc/AB2
7-SE45].
454. See generally Katie R. Eyer, The New Jim Crow Is the Old Jim Crow, 128 YALE L.J.
1002 (2019); Chin et al., supra note 2; Gabriel J. Chin, Jim Crow’s Long Goodbye, 21
CONST. COMMENT. 107 (2004).
455. MARSH, supra note 1, at 58.
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY,
AND POLITICAL CHANGE 6–7 (Univ. of Mich. 2d ed. 2004) (1974) (“The political approach . . .
prompts us to approach rights as skeptics. Instead of thinking of judicially asserted rights
as accomplished social facts or as moral imperatives, they must be thought of, on the one
hand, as authoritatively articulated goals of public policy and, on the other, as political resources of unknown value in the hands of those who want to alter the course of public policy.
The direct linking of rights, remedies, and change that characterizes the myth of rights
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On the other hand, scholars show how litigation can ignite social
change, stating how litigation can spark movements once the community understands that their actual plight is incongruent with
the rights mandated by the court.459 This type of mobilization can
lead to political action, which can lead to real social justice.460
Marsh, however, was not naive to the system’s boundaries. Marsh
used his commitment to the law and bar membership to spark
change; he later turned to public office to legislatively enforce
much of his early work as a civil rights attorney.
Litigation campaigns may have been a more fitting strategy for
the classical civil rights period than it might be as a single tool for
today’s struggle. Marsh utilized a strategy was called “the lawyercontrolled litigation campaign” strategy where he would choose his
plaintiffs.461 The purpose of this was to identify the case with facts
that would paint the claims in the most attractive light and facts
that best frame the legal claim being made.462 This strategy made
the precedent setting Green v. New Kent County case a success.
While this may not be the best strategy for today, the courage, selfsacrifice, and the will to outlast the opposition that was required
then also remains today.
Movement lawyers then were facing nearly impossible odds.
This was evidenced in Marsh’s battle in Norfolk to integrate
schools that took over twenty years. The NAACP had shifted its
focus toward dismantling the resistance to segregation. Marsh was
taking cases in Norfolk, Virginia, where he had a positive ruling
from a local judge. The judge, succumbing to pressure, began to
rule against Marsh in subsequent cases.463 One such case was
rooted in a bussing issue that hindered the integration of Norfolk
schools. Marsh used the appeal as a strategic tool to move the case
forward. It would take a substitute judge for Marsh to succeed in
must, in sum, be exchanged for a more complex framework, the politics of rights, which
takes into account the contingent character of rights in the American system.”). Scholars
also pushed back on this simplistic view of movement lawyers as not understanding the lack
of correlation between litigation and change.
459. See, e.g., Ann Southworth, Lawyers and the “Myth of Rights” in Civil Rights and
Poverty Practice, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 469, 469 (1999) (asserting that the use of empirical
research on civil rights and poverty lawyers shows that this characterization of civil rights
and poverty lawyers is accurate).
460. See generally STEVEN C. TAUBER, NAVIGATING THE JUNGLE: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE
ANIMAL ADVOCACY MOVEMENT (2016).
461. Mark Tushnet, Some Legacies of Brown v. Board of Education, 90 VA. L. REV. 1693,
1697 (2004).
462. Id.
463. See supra section III.A.2.b.
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his Norfolk cases. Movement lawyers today face a similar uphill
battle.
C. By Any Means Necessary
Not all cases take twenty years to reach satisfactory conclusions.
Nevertheless, as it relates to movement lawyering and equity in
education, the levels of justice that have been reached so far have
come as a result of attitudes that say the work must be done by
any means necessary. This tenacious spirit has wrought systemic
changes as movement lawyers have filled a number of rolls in the
fight for justice. They have served on the front lines of activism, in
churches, on boards and committees, and members of clubs and
associations, acting as the glue holding the fight for freedom together.
The second Part of the Article follows Marsh’s journey into city
council, when he became Vice-Mayor, and when he became the first
Black Mayor of the former capital of the Confederacy and then
later a State Senator. As a legislator, he continued to work for educational opportunity and equity. He worked on the same issues
from different positions of influence.
The career and activism of Marsh demonstrate how multipronged approaches have helped to establish a greater equity for
all people, which becomes a part of the foundations of justice. As
Marsh’s contributions to a better society are assessed, a case can
be made that the lawyers seeking to do this work today must take
a multipronged approach using litigation and legislation is necessary to continue to make progress.
D. Lawyers Roles in Advancing Movements
The lived experiences of accomplished leaders often serve as
templates for those who were mentored by them, others who would
follow behind them, and those of us who would study them. As an
aside, hearing the colorful depictions of how to blaze trails from
those who blazed them, rather than by the secondhand interpretations of scholars, especially those with no communal connection, is
invaluable. When the story is told by the person who lived it, anecdotal and cultural nuances are preserved. The spirit behind motives can be discerned and a more realistic assessment of the price
that was paid can be made.
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Marsh identified with the challenges of the common man, as did
many movement lawyers who were often underpaid and overworked, even though they were among the great minds of their day.
They introduced the innovative strategies that helped Black people
see advancements many would not dare to imagine. Marsh tells
the story of the feeling of injustice he experienced as he was required to walk for miles to get to school while his White counterparts road busses. Marsh speaks of the indignation that rested in
his belly, leading him to become a person of courage and to visualize a life of destiny. Marsh would become a protégé of Oliver Hill,
subsequently serving as one of the lawyers on the Brown case that
would set a precedent for equality in education that would endure
until this day. From there, he would go on to advance the cause of
equality as a member of Virginia’s legislature.
As one man, Marsh served as a community leader, legal advocate, and political representative. The truth of the matter is that
there are a broad range of roles that must be filled to advance a
cause that would address the plight of the approximately 22.6 million Black people that existed in 1970.464 The movement for equality was advanced by influencers, financers, teachers, pastors, common people, and the like. That said, Marsh’s life demonstrates the
duality between the voiceless and those who have a voice and the
boots on the ground frontline activists and policy makers. This is
demonstrative of the idea that lawyers can and should leverage the
many avenues for engaging with and taking leadership in justice
for the underserved.
CONCLUSION: THE POWER OF STRATEGY
Marsh’s life encompasses several themes: the importance of
choosing a strategy, facing resistance, and leveraging power.
Henry Marsh represents the courage and intellectual preeminence
of a movement lawyer who fought on the front lines for the desegregation of public schools and civil rights at-large. During the
1950s, the NAACP made sweeping strides for equality through
overwhelming success in legal cases that would advance the causes
of oppressed Black people. Some major wins included: reversing
restrictive covenants, changing rules for White primaries, equal
treatment in the judicial system, desegregating law schools and

464. WE THE AMERICANS: BLACKS, U.S. DEP’T OF COM. (Sept. 1993), https://www.cens
us.gov/prod/cen1990/wepeople/we-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/PFV4-3MRS].
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other higher learning institutions, and integrating public facilities
including libraries and dining halls, housing, and transportation.
Despite these advances, educational inequality remained a challenge for Black people. On May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court
deemed the segregation of public schools unconstitutional.465 Proponents of the ruling braced for a relatively slow transition of possibly two to five years to see real changes implemented after the
verdict; they never dreamed that segregationists would defy the
court’s ruling to the extent that they did.
Marsh and other civil rights attorneys bravely took up the cause,
fighting within the court system for more than a decade. In doing
so, Marsh and others took center stage and placed Virginia in the
middle of what would be one of the most divisive issues to face the
southern states since the civil war. Rulings made in favor of enforcing desegregation and other victories came at a cost that only
those on the front lines could ever know. But it was their sacrifice
that provided a shift to more equal treatment under the law and
vastly improved opportunities for Black people, particularly as it
relates to equality in education.
The NAACP’s and their movement lawyers’ litigation strategy
was a valid option because it could realize specific goals. Then,
Marsh’s and other NAACP lawyers’ objectives included educating
the public and judges about the educational inequities that existed
related to Black people. Many White Justices and leaders feigned
ignorance, and civil rights lawyers made compelling cases for
equality, which resulted in new legal precedent against segregation. Today, the issue is more about a blatant disregard for the
knowledge that previous generations of lawyers and scholars have
posited about educational injustice and the maintenance of fundamental human rights for the disenfranchised. The resistance that
ensued after the Court’s rulings in favor of desegregation is evidence that social and educational movements must shift from a
primary focus on the judicial regulation of equity to including a
legislative regulation of equity and other social justice work.
Though there is still much work to be done, movement lawyers’
legal and political advocacy has played a significant historic role in
Black people’s educational opportunities. During political independence, the strategy turned to Black leaders’ election to office,
hoping to legislatively sustain any educational progress and fully

465.

See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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actualize Brown’s promise. All these activities occurred within a
broader social movement. Today, lawyers must step up as advocates of civil rights more than ever. Representation in legislature
is critical. Leaders on the frontlines of the Movement can strategically continue the struggle for educational justice, especially if
armed with a historical understanding of the shoulders on whom
they stand.

